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This appeal seeks to reverse a judgment sustaining a 
family settlement agreement materially altering the estate plan of 
Edward Miller Grimm reflected in his wills and a spendthrift trust 
despite Mr. Grimm's widow and their childrens' uncontroverted and 
unequivocal repudiation of the coercively obtained settlement 
arrangement years prior to court approval and, indeed, years prior 
to any petition seeking court approval. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
Igsuss With Rgqgrd to Repudiation 
1. Whether a court has the power pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 75-3-1101 and 75-3-1102 to approve a family settlement 
agreement materially altering the disposition of an estate under an 
inter vivos spendthrift trust and wills when the settlement 
arrangement has been unequivocally repudiated by the Trustor's and 
Testator's beneficiaries prior to court approval and prior to the 
filing of any petition seeking court approval. 
2. Whether the lower court erroneously and improperly 
concluded: "The Family Settlement Agreement was not subject to 
repudiation without legal consequences prior to approval by the 
court. Failure to obtain court approval does not invalidate the 
Family Settlement Agreement. The Family Settlement Agreement could 
be presented to the court for approval at any time prior to 
distribution and closing of the estate." (Conclusion No. 8, CR. 
1232). 
Issue With Regard to Spendthrift Trust 
3. Whether a court can approve a family settlement 
agreement pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-1101 and 75-3-1102 
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terminating or materially altering an inter vivos spendthrift 
trust for the support and maintenance of the widow of the trustor. 
Issue With Regard to Notice 
4. Whether the court can approve a family settlement 
agreement materially altering a will of Edward Miller Grimm when 
on the uncontroverted facts there has been no notice to two 
co-executors of Mr. Grimm's Philippine will/ Charles Parsons and 
Byron S. Huie# as required by Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1102(c). 
Issues With Regard to Right to Jury Trial 
5. Whether the plaintiffs, Maxine# Peter and Linda 
Grimm/ have a right to jury trial on the issues of duress and 
failure of consideration when the defendants, Ethel Roberts and 
Juanita Morris, counterclaimed for breach of contract of the 
family settlement agreement and sought damages of $10,000,000 and 
the plaintiffs pled duress and failure of consideration as 
affirmative defenses as required by Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure to the counterclaim. 
6. Whether the plaintiff/ Maxine Grimm/ was denied her 
right to jury trial on her claim of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress when the court dismissed the jury at the close 
of the evidence. 
7. Whether plaintiffs, Maxine, Peter and Linda Grimm/ 
were wrongfully denied their right to jury trial on their claims 
and defenses with regard to the family settlement agreement when 
the court impaneled a jury under a bench ruling in which the court 
stated: MI never questioned the right to your trial by jury for 
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legal issues. There is no problem with that . . . . We can 
impanel a jury, but the court will still make the ultimate 
decision as to whether or not the contracts are valid or invalid. 
Then the jury can decide the legal issues. . . .H (July 26-30/ 
1985 TR. at 19). "Therefore, I grant you the benefit of having a 
jury trial, but so that everybody understands, the court will make 
the decision as to whether or not the family settlement agreement 
is valid or invalid, and then based upon that you may proceed on 
your counterclaim — you may not proceed, but at that time the 
plaintiffs here cannot say that thev didn't have the right for the 
iurv to hear all of the defenses with regard to coercion, duress 
and other defenses . . . .H (July 26-30, 1985 TR. at 23). And 
then at the close of evidence dismissed the jury and eight months 
later entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
including findings and conclusions on the issues of failure of 
consideration and duress. 
Issues With Regard to the Court's Findings and Conclusions 
A. Failure of Consideration. 
8. Whether the forbearance of the defendants' cal-
culated campaign "to cause trouble" in the probate and administra-
tion of Mr. Grimm's estate was adequate consideration for a family 
settlement agreement or constituted a good faith controversy under 
the Uniform Probate Code. 
9. Whether the court improperly concluded that fore-
bearance of claims could furnish adequate consideration for a 
family settlement agreement regardless of whether any claim of the 
defendants to Mr. Grimm's estate was a bona fide or reasonable 
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claim or, as the court phrased it in its Findings and 
Conclusions: "It was not necessary to find whether they [the 
defendants' claims] were or were not unfounded.- (Finding No. 
65C, CR. 1236). 
10. Whether there was a failure of consideration for the 
family settlement agreement when the defendants on the 
uncontroverted facts did not have and did not assert any 
reasonable or bona fide claim to participate in Mr. Grimm's estate 
beyond what Mr. Grimm desired to give them under his estate plan 
reflected in his wills and spendthrift trust. 
B. Duress, Failure of Consideration and Good Faith Controversy 
11. Whether the court's findings and conclusions with 
regard to duress, failure of consideration and good faith 
controversy were clearly erroneous, inadequate and contrary to the 
documentary evidence and the testimony of the defendants. 
C. Fundamental Inadequacy of Court's Findings. 
12. Whether the court's findings adopted virtually 
verbatim from those proposed by the defendants on the issues of 
duress, coercion, waiver, ratification, failure of consideration and 
good faith controversy are not only clearly erroneous, but in their 
consistent disregard of the evidentiary record, including the 
exhibits and the defendants' own testimony, demonstrate a 
fundamental abdication of the court's responsibility to fairly 
adjudicate and find the facts subject to its determination. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The sections of the Uniform Probate Code controlling 
court approval of a family settlement agreement are set forth in 
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Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-1101 and 75-3-1102. These sections are set 
forth verbatim in the addendum to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Parties, the Nature of the Case and the Course of 
Proceedings and Disposition in the Lower Court. 
Edward Miller Grimm died on November 27, 1977 in Manila, 
Republic of the Philippines. 
Mr. Grimm left a large estate with a value at the time of 
his death in excess of $8,000,000. (DX-272). He disposed of his 
estate under two wills and an inter vivos spendthrift trust. 
(PX-6, 7, 11). 
Mr. Grimm was survived by his widow, Maxine Tate Grimm, 
their two children, Linda and Pete Grimm, and by two children of a 
prior marriage, Ethel Grimm Roberts and Juanita Grimm Morris. 
The plaintiffs, Maxine, Pete and Linda Grimm, and the 
defendants, Ethel Roberts, Juanita Morris and their mother, Mr. 
Grimm's first wife, Juanita Kegley Grimm, entered into a family 
settlement agreement (FSA) on April 25, 1978. (PX-58, 59). The 
FSA materially altered the disposition Mr. Grimm had made of his 
estate under his wills and trust. (Compare PX-6, 7, 11 with 
PX-58, 59). 
The plaintiff-appellants are Maxine, Pete and Linda Grimm 
and E. LaVar Tate, Mrs. Grimm's brother and her co-executor of 
what is referred to as Mr. Grimm's non-Philippine will. 
(Plaintiffs). 
The defendant-respondents are Ethel Roberts and Juanita 
Morris, Juanita Kegley Grimm, and Rex Roberts, the second husband 
-5-
of Ethel Roberts/ whom she married in 1969, (Defendants). 
The course of the proceedings in the court below were 
unusual. 
This appeal arises from a consolidated action. The 
actions that were consolidated were originally a probate 
proceeding denominated In the Matter of the Estate of Edward 
Miller Grimm, Probate No. 3720, and a civil action, Maxine Tate 
Grimm, et. al. v. Ethel Grimm Roberts, et. al.. Civil No. 
C-80-0322. Both actions were filed in the Third Judicial District 
Court of Tooele County and were consolidated by order of the court 
of January 20, 1981. (CR. 194).1 
The probate proceeding insofar as it affects this consol-
idated action, was commenced by Ethel Roberts and Juanita Morris 
filing a petition to remove Maxine Grimm and LaVar Tate as the 
supervised personal representatives of Mr. Grimm's estate on May 
16, 1980. The petition sought to have Maxine and her brother 
Although the actions were consolidated, the Tooele County 
Clerk's office continued to maintain separate files in the probate 
and civil actions and some original papers were filed in one file 
and some in the other even though all original papers after the 
order of consolidation were appropriately styled to show that they 
were filed in the consolidated action. The Tooele County Clerk's 
office in paginating and indexing the record pursuant to Rule 11 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, has paginated and indexed 
two separate records, one for the original papers that the Clerk's 
office filed in the probate action and one for the original papers 
the Clerk's office filed in the civil action. Since the Clerk's 
office has maintained the record in this manner, citations to the 
record will refer to "PR." for original papers filed, indexed and 
paginated by the Clerk's office in the probate action and "CR." for 
the civil action. 
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removed as supervised personal representatives of Mr. Grimm's 
estate, to have Valley Bank & Trust Company appointed as a special 
administrator and to have Mrs. Grimm and Mr. Tate render an 
accounting. The petition did not seek or request in any way that 
the court approve the family settlement agreement, nor did it ask 
for a distribution of Mr. Grimm's estate in accordance with the 
family settlement agreement. The petition speaks for itself. 
(PR. 84-81). 
Maxine Grimm and LaVar Tate responded to the probate 
petition to remove them as personal representatives by filing an 
answer and counterclaim on September 10, 1980. (PR. 236-152). 
Simultaneously, on September 10, 1980, the plaintiffs commenced 
the civil action by filing a complaint against the Roberts, Mrs. 
Morris and Juanita Kegley Grimm. (CR. 101-1). The complaint and 
counterclaim alleged substantially parallel claims and funda-
mentally attacked the validity of the FSA. (CR. 101-1, PR. 
236-152). The complaint sought to set aside the FSA on numerous 
grounds, including duress, failure of consideration, material 
alteration of a spendthrift trust, and the failure of the 
defendants to submit the FSA for court approval pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 75-3-1101 and 75-3-1102. (Pltfs Complaint, Second 
Cause of Action, CR. 86, Fifth Cause of Action, CR. 79, Sixth 
Cause of Action, CR. 78, and Tenth Cause of Action, CR. 74). 
The complaint also alleged a cause of action by Mrs. 
Grimm against the Roberts and Mrs. Morris for the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress (Pltfs Complaint, Eleventh Cause 
-7-
of Action, CR. 72) and sought compensatory and punitive damages on 
that cause of action. 
In February of 1981, after consolidation, the defendants 
answered the complaint (CRo 203-195) and replied to the counter-
claim (CR. 212-204). The defendants, again, did not in any way 
seek court approval of the FSA. (Id.). In fact, the defendants 
did not seek court approval of the FSA until 4 years later when 
the defendants obtained leave to file an amended answer and 
counterclaim on February 13, 1985. (CR. 362, 373-372). In their 
counterclaim the defendants for the first time sought court 
approval of the FSA. (PR. 1634). In addition, Ethel and Juanita 
also counterclaimed against Maxine, Pete and Linda for breach of 
the FSA and sought damages wby reason of the breach of the 
FSA . . . in an amount . . . estimated to be $10,000,000.w (PR. 
1632). The plaintiffs in reply to the counterclaim for breach of 
contract set up as affirmative defenses, as required by Rule 8(c) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, their defenses of duress and 
failure of consideration. (CR. 948-941). 
The plaintiffs made a timely demand for trial by jury. 
(CR. 873-871). The defendants objected and the court after 
briefing and argument issued a bench ruling. The court's ruling 
should speak for itself. The court in its ruling stated: 
I never questioned the right to your trial by jury 
for legal issues. There's no problem with that 
. . . We can impanel a jury, but the court will 
still make the ultimate decision as to whether the 
contracts are valid or invalid. Then the jury can 
decide on the legal issues. 
The court will make the decision and have the jury 
sit through the whole case, hear the issues with 
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regard to duress, coercion as to how they apply, 
if we get beyond the determination of whether or 
not the contracts are valid. That is the first 
issue. . . . (July 26, 30, 1985 TR at 19). 
Therefore, I grant you the benefit of having a 
jury trial, but so that everybody understands, the 
court will make the decision as to whether or not 
the family settlement agreement is valid or in-
valid, and then based upon that you may proceed on 
your counterclaim — you may not proceed, but at 
that time the plaintiffs here cannot say that they 
didn't have the right for the jury to hear all of 
the defenses with regard to coercion, duress and 
other defenses. . . . (July 26, 30, 1985 TR. at 
23). 
The plaintiffs made it clear to the court that their 
right to jury trial extended to Maxine's claim for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress (July 26, 30, 1985 TR. at 7) and to 
the issues of duress and failure of consideration. (Id. at 22). 
"There are questions, your Honor, that go to the validity of the 
family settlement agreement which are duress and failure of con-
sideration that in my view, your Honor, the court cannot determine 
in face of the demand for jury trial." (Id.). 
Trial in the consolidated action commenced on August 6, 
2 
1985. A jury was impaneled. (TRA. 3). After 9 days of 
2The transcript of the trial was transcribed by two different 
reporters. The first reporter transcribed the first 3 volumes of 
the transcript and paginated the transcript from page 1 in Volume I 
to page 527 in Volume III. The second reporter transcribed the re-
maining 6 volumes of the transcript and paginated those volumes from 
page 1 in Volume IV to page 1127 in Volume IX. Since the pagination 
of the transcript does not read in consecutive numbered order for 
the entire transcript, the first 3 volumes of the transcript are 
referred to as MTRAH and the last 6 volumes of the transcript as 
HTRB.M For example, TRB-100 refers to page 100 of Volume IV of the 
transcript. 
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trial at the close of the evidence the court simply ruled: "The 
court finds the case in favor of the defendants and against the 
plaintiffs" and dismissed the jury. (TRB. 1125). 
The court gave absolutely no reasons for its decision nor 
did the court indicate the procedure — whether it was deciding 
the case on the merits, a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(b) 
or a motion for a directed verdict pursuant to Rule 50. The court 
stated that it would "submit a memorandum as to my decision." 
(TRB. 1125). The court did not do so. 
Eight months later the court entered its findings and 
conclusions of law adopted virtually verbatim, including 
typographical errors, from those proposed by the defendants (CR. 
1254-1231) and entered its judgment (CR. 1258-1255). 
The court's judgment simply approved the FSA pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-1101 and 75-3-1102 and summarily denied the 
parties all other relief on their complaint and counterclaim, 
including the removal of Mrs. Grimm and Mr. Tate as personal 
representatives of Mr. Grimm's estate and the defendants' demand 
for an accounting. (CR. 1258-1255). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This statement of facts sets forth the essential facts 
with regard to the creation of Mr. Grimm's estate plan, how that 
plan five months after his death came to be materially altered by 
the FSA and the unequivocal repudiation of the FSA by Mr. Grimm's 
primary beneficiaries, his widow and their children. 
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Since the court below entered findings, this statement 
focuses on the documentary exhibits and the testimony of the 
defendants and their witnesses. Most of this evidence, including 
the defendants' own evidence, is simply omitted from the court's 
findings or encompassed in ultimate findings such as, "The 
defendants did not know that the claims they asserted were 
unfounded" (Finding 65C at CR. 1236); or "None of the plaintiffs 
were put in such fear as to overcome their free will" (Finding 65D 
at CR. 1235). 
A. Edward Miller Grimm. His Family, His Career, and His Estate 
Plan. 
Edward Miller Grimm lived a successful and colorful 
life. He was one of the early American businessmen in the Far 
East and developed a successful stevedoring business in Manila 
before the Second World War. (TRA. 18-19, 23-24). 
He married Juanita Kegley Grimm on February 22, 1926. 
They had two children, Ethel Grimm Roberts and Juanita Grimm 
Morris. (CR. 1253). The family resided in the Philippines until 
1937 when Juanita Kegley Grimm took her children and returned to 
the United States. (Id.) 
During the Second World War Mr. Grimm served as a Colonel 
on General Douglas MacArthur's staff. (TRA. 11). He was respons-
ible for logistics. (TRA. 11). Maxine served as a recreational 
director for the American Red Cross and met Mr. Grimm in the 
Philippines late in the war. (TRA. 11-12). 
After the War, Mr. Grimm obtained a divorce from Juanita 
Kegley Grimm. (PX-1, 2, 3). Mr. Grimm established residency in 
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Nevada for the purpose of obtaining a divorce and filed an action 
for divorce. (PX-1). Juanita appeared in the action arid filed a 
cross-complaint for divorce. (PX-2). After trial, she was 
awarded a divorce by a decree of divorce on June 2, 1947. (PX-3). 
Mr. Grimm married Maxine on June 25, 1947 in Tooele, 
Utah. (PX-5). They had two children, Pete and Linda. (TRA. 
10). Pete was born November 20, 1951, and Linda was born February 
28, 1953. (TRA. 10). Prior to Mr. Grimm entering the hospital in 
October of 1977, no one in 30 years had ever raised any question 
as to the validity of Mr. Grimm's divorce or his marriage to 
Maxine. (TRA. 10, 103). 
Edward and Maxine had a strong and happy marriage. (TRA. 
19, 25). They maintained residences in the Philippines and in 
Tooele, Utah, and traveled extensively. (CR. 1252). Although, 
they spent most of their time in the Philippines until the last 
two years of Mr. Grimm's life when they spent more time in Tooele 
(TRA. 28), Mr. Grimm remained an American citizen. (TRA. 9, TRB. 
15). 
Shortly after Mr. Grimm's remarriage, Ethel, too, moved 
to the Philippines where she still resides with her husband, Rex. 
(TRA. 26-27, 464). Juanita remained in the United States and now 
lives in California with her family. (TRA. 27; TRB. 1079). Prior 
to Mr. Grimm entering the hospital in October of 1977, Maxine had 
maintained good relationships with Ethel, Nita and their families, 
although, of course she did not see Nita and her family as often 
as she did the Roberts and Ethel's children. (TRA. 27, 483-84). 
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Mr. Grimm's children described him as a strong and 
gracious man who was "very independent." (TRA. 477; TRB. 408). 
Ethel described Maxine as a loving, kind and religious person, 
whose family was her whole life. (TRA. 484-85). 
After the war, Mr. Grimm successfully rebuilt his busi-
nesses with his long time partner, Charles Parsons. (TRA. 
20-21). Mr. Grimm and Mr. Parsons concentrated their business 
activities in stevedoring, shipping and molasses ventures in the 
Far East, including the Philippines, Hong Kong and Japan. (TRA. 
20-22). Together they owned and operated numerous enterprises, 
including Femola, GP and Hong Kong Transportation. (Id.). Mr. 
Grimm also owiied an American company, Globe Investment Company, 
with substantial assets. (DX-272, TRA. 433). 
Mr. Grimm disposed of his estate under two wills and an 
inter vivos spendthrift trust. (PX-6, 7, 11). The two wills were 
executed in 1959 and the spendthrift trust in July of 1977. 
(PX-6, 7, 11). Mr. Grimm executed his two wills while he was in 
San Francisco in 1959. (PX-6, 7; TRB. 1101-02). 
One will, characterized as his non-Philippine will, dis-
posed of all of Mr. Grimm's property/ both real and personal/ out-
side of the Philippine Islands. (PX-6). His Philippine will/ on 
the other hand/ disposed of all of Mr. Grimm's property situate in 
the Philippine Islands. (PX-7). 
Under the non-Philippine will/ Mr. Grimm left his estate 
to Maxine/ Pete and Linda. (PX-6). He explicitly made no provi-
sion for Ethel and Juanita under his non-Philippine will and 
appointed LaVar and Maxine as co-executors. (PX-6). 
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Under Mr, Grimm's Philippine will, Mr. Grimm left 61.5% 
of his estate subject to that will to Maxine and divided the bulk 
of the remainder of his estate among his four children, Ethel, 
Nita, Pete and Linda. (PX-7, 169D; TRB. 697). 
The gift to Mr. Grimm's children under his Philippine 
will in amount was measured by what is known as the Law of 
Legitime. (PX-7; TRB. 344-45, 359-60, 368). The Law of Legitime 
in civil code countries is a law establishing the rights of com-
pulsory heirs in a decedent's estate. Children as well as the 
wife are compulsory heirs under the Law of Legitime. (TRB. 343). 
The Law of Legitime, however, and its compulsory heir provisions 
were not applicable to Mr. Grimm's estate regardless of whether he 
was domiciled in Utah or in the Philippines. (TRB. 359-60, 
344-45, 368). Under Philippine law and specifically Art. 16 of 
the Philippine Civil Code, the Law of Legitime is simply inapplic-
able to foreign nationals, whose rights of succession are deter-
mined by the law of their nationality. (TRB. 359-60; PX-180). As 
a consequence, Mr. Grimm's children had no compulsory interest in 
Mr. Grimm's estate under the Law of Legitime and Mr. Grimm was 
free to determine what, if anything, he wished to leave his 
children. (Id.). 
Under the Philippine will, Mr. Grimm designated Byron S. 
Huie and his long-time partner, Charles Parsons, as co-executors 
with Maxine. (PX-7). Rex Roberts testified Mr. Parsons had not 
been given notice and there was no evidence — none — Mr. Huie 
had been given notice that the defendants were seeking court 
approval of the FSA. (TRB. 992-93). 
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'"" I I Ii I , I" "I , \)r i iiiin e x e n i i l , - I I h e l iu . - i l h e e x e c u l n 6 a n d 
f l e l i v e r e d H w r i t t e n a s s i g nmeri L o f a 1 I r) f, h i s s t o c k i n 11 o b e 
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4 " ! I  III."") , T h e I r a i l ni I" f i t I  Ii f i l i a l n I n v e s hinriiot'it rnrnpan^ s t o c k 
a l s o r e f l e c t e d on t h e s t o c k l e d g e r s oil t h e company on In I / I 
1977 (PX-li?) arid a new s t o c k c e r t i f i c a t e was i s s u e d and d e l i v e r e d 
t ' lJel.e, "in I n i s t e e i II III1 , 1 Il i l , ( I I " X II I ) , 
A f t e r Mr, Grimm e x e c u t e d h i s t r u s t in J u l y of 1977 in 
T o o e l e , ho M \ i x i n e a nd Pe t e r e t u rned f o t h e P h i l i p p i n e s . (TR11. 
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numerous additional assets to the trust, including his interest in 
Femola (PX-19) and Hong Kong Transportation Company. (PX-22). 
Each one of the transfers was reflected in a written assignment 
signed by Mr. Grimm and notarized by Judge Tiongson. (PX-14-55; 
TRB. 444, 449-50). Each one of the assignments was delivered by 
Mr. Grimm to Pete as trustee of the trust. (TRB. 450, 448-49). 
The uncontroverted evidence, including Ethel's testimony, 
was that Mr. Grimm was clearly competent at the time he executed 
the trust. (TRA. 19, 44, 480, 482; TRB. 442). 
Mr. Grimm did not transfer to the trust a receivable in-
volving the Everett Steamship Company which he had realized as a 
dividend upon the sale of Luzon Stevedoring in 1964. (TRB. 449; 
DX-267 at 2). The Everett Steamship receivable, a Philippine 
asset, was a receivable for three payments in the amount of 
approximately $984,000 each due on June 30, 1978, June 30, 1979 
and June 30, 1980. (CR. 1250). Even after the creation of the 
trust, the Everett Steamship receivable was still subject to Mr. 
Grimm's Philippine will. (CR. 1250). 
The court received in evidence uncontroverted summaries 
of Mr. Grimm's estate plan prepared by Merrill Norman, a C.P.A. 
(TRB. 672-751; PX-169, 169A-1690). Under Mr. Grimm's estate plan, 
100% of the assets under the trust, 50% of the assets under the 
non-Philippine will, and 61.5% of the assets under the Philippine 
will were all dedicated to the maintenance and support of Maxine. 
(PX-169D). In total, after taxes, debt and administration costs, 
88.6% of Mr. Grimm's entire estate was dedicated to Maxine's main-
tenance and support. (PX-169E). Mr. Grimm gave Pete and Linda 
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50% of his estate under the tin in.t 11 I i 11 i I to Maxine's interest, 
•JU% unci ti I I IIII HI HI 1 h i 1 i p i n m i H I I I in mi in ill ' I i mi mi mi in I III in I In l" I in in I 11 > 11 in in in i 
w i l l IPX I B ^ l ) Mr G r i m m o n l y l e f t El h e 11 mil N i t a i 7% n t I r i s 
t i l l «H a s : ( i i* u n f l n r in n R t-a t-r - p ] n r p u r « u m n t f ' r i H i e P h i l i p p i n e 
will mi l J X I b ' i l i I in ill u n i i i t i r u i l i t L IIIIIIIIIII il n i w r i u u i i i ini M I u n i t in/1 
$ 9 6 , 4 2 3 , 1 1 0 1...I1 . M/ G r i m m ' s e s t a t e p l a n ( P X - 1 6 9 B ) , wh i h:i 
I I i  M ("i" ' Li lhMhi it * ill I  I lii i > i I I  1111 I 1 I o f h i s w i d o w N a x i n e . 
( P X - 1 6 9 B I In I , b M , H /» il 1 I M I t intouit l w a s p r o t e c t e d hy I h e 
s p e n d t h r i f t c l a u s e <>t f lu I i , . , J , IPX 1 (>"])• 
K U i e l b 1 ' h i e d t b O e f u i e Mi ._£JLAAU!!L!>» J Q l - a i l l . 
n t u ' l iliill n i t l i k e i n , G r i m m ' s e s t a t e p l a n (TPA fi?) 
IN1 w a n t e d m o r p t h a n hf > 11 111II t»1 I  I u 11 in ».'i I t<J r . (TRA , 4 8 S - 8 6 ) E v e n 
b e i u t i . Mi i II I  IIIIIIIIIII ill IIII ill I  I In I  i m i l t i»i in I I IIMIi i i 111 1111 I i IIIi miii mult ill M.n IIIIIUI 
cause a WIJI tu tni prepared t nat treat i»< i M UP i and Nita equally 
w I I Ii P o t (• iwiri L i ml ii, ml I I hi \ ) Hhp I o l d Ma x i n p t h a t inn 1 n«- s 
M a x j n e t Giriiiini e x e c u t e a new w i l l luj mini I ill r J U I i l i m i l i l e . 
( T R A , 63 r ^ > 
fc
 Jiti 
her mothei was llicyo. -m" **i3 marrid . -,*. . - . * . u 
(TR/ b < '^ - OK :<u jtr-ii *ttoir^-y from 
h r 
fathe: ' u'it- - * xjjenbf r^ X-u 
-/hile M alive, 
she 
In order to evaluate this si' . -,~n prior 
co taking legal action I request u.jt you 
furnish me with a copy oi the Trust A . S W ,. 
want a 1 :i st of all assets whereve- n the 
best of your knowledge a list of all known 
outstanding obligations owing by his estate. I 
would like to have this by Monday at the latest. 
Maxine, I hope that we will be able to work 
out something that will not involve court 
procedure. We both understand what this will 
mean, but I can see that you are giving us no 
other option. (PX-70). 
Maxine as a result of Ethel's demand, asked that a new 
will be prepared for Mr. Grimm's consideration dividing one-half 
of Mr. Grimm's estate equally between Ethel, Nita, Pete and Linda 
so that if Mr. Grimm wanted to he could change his estate plan and 
execute a new will. (TRA. 233; TRB. 426-27, 544). The will did 
not arrive before Mr. Grimm died (TRA. 233; TRB. 426-27) and the 
subject of a new will was never discussed with him before his 
death. (TRA. 451, 233). 
C. The Roberts' Campaign to Coerce Maxine into a Family 
Settlement Agreement. 
After Mr. Grimm's death Ethel and Rex undertook a cam-
paign to illegally gain control of Mr. Grimm's estate and to in-
timidate Maxine into signing a settlement. 
In December of 1977, Maxine returned with Linda to Tooele 
for a second funeral and Mr. Grimm's burial. (TRA. 75-76). She 
remained in Utah from early December, 1977 until February 22, 1978 
when she returned to the Philippines. (TRA. 77, 121-22). When 
she left, she intended to promptly return to the Philippines and 
disclosed her intention to Ethel. (TRA. 76; TRB. 14). 
Ethel did not wait. While Maxine was absent from the 
Philippines, Ethel caused herself to be appointed as special 
administratrix for Mr. Grimm's estate. (PX-79, 80). Ethel, by 
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ho< n i o d hi s p r u r e c o n t r o l of Mr. Grimm's e s t a t e . 
(TRi IM H I II I I 
E t h e l s e c u r e d her dppointmenl as s p e c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t r i x 
I I, ( i l i i)i i pi i in i i mi v e r i f i e d p e t i t i o n on r^rnmhor "J i'i ' 
(PX- /'I IJII in mi me kuy d i i ii"')iim i onij ill m n In i >> vei i i i<»u i IJL i i i in 
s h e acknowledq^rl , were 111 f L f he r f a t h e r d i e d i n t e s t a t e «nici f 2.) 
M.^VI M w i I i»« i Un I I  mi In piu 1 i p p i n p s i I I IRA. htJ j j* 
Both allegations wete taJ^e and Ethel knew they were 
false I1 "KiiiF in fact had resided in the Philippines for 10 year* 
a in i II In in II in 111 mi M I I I I I I I II III mi II i p r n i n n ' ' M I . I f T 1 7 » II III ' ) ' ' 1 1 1 II I II i r II il 
c o u i s e ; k n e w t h a t I I llt'A >! \ » l l l « l I k l l 1 I h i l e i t h e K J J I w a j j , 
s i g n e d i n A p i i l o f I "I II F I In >l I D i n e d i n a n m i o t i d e d p e t i t i o n i n 
w I i in II in I  I i i I  II n 11 M it I 1 I  in in II Ifi II in i mi in mi i i ii i in . in mi i s i I  11«in mi I i I  I  II in i I  I in mi I  JI i 11 in i in i 
p r e c i s e l y c o n t r a r y hi Ino p e r j u r i o u s il l e g a t i o n (Compare DX-214 
w i t h PX-7*'M , 
II1 II II I II LI 111 II ill II I I III I I I I II I II I I I I S i i l . H I I I I I1 f i l l I I Ml I 
Nit a knew t h a t , i l i l i I inl i i*RA 5 0 7 - 0 8 ; PX-73, <" i H fa t e s t i -
f . n 1 '!< I i . . h( r f l i the i I .i,f Rxecntprl w i l l ; in 1959 (TRP 1101) 
anil in December "»< l l* M b e i u i e El.heJ f i l e d h e r p e t i t i o n , lie 
w r o t e Maxine and s a i d in p a r t ; "I hope you w i l l send ioe a copy uf 
Daddy* MI I I "i m y . n III i III I hi mi I Ii ill IK! tin 1 ind 1 wi ' ie 
m e n t i o n e d in , - j o r t a n l t ir me t o km ui I he 
d e t a i l ^ a*- t hi ^ I inda had w r i t t e n E t h e l n 
I II II In 11 in in mi I n d ji l t j i i ' i ««•• ' in 
•Ethel there was * . -^ w: . >x >3; TRA. 505-08) and Ethel 
a ::;know 1 edged di m a i LUOL one miew Maxine believed there were 
wills when she left the Philippines to return to Tooele for Mr. 
Grimm's burial. (TRA. 508). 
The Robert's campaign did not stop with Ethel's appoint-
ment. In January of 1978 they broke into Maxine's Philippine 
home. (TRB. 24, 18, 20, 636-37; TRA. 110-11, 113). Rex and Ethel 
entered Maxine's home without Maxine's permission and removed the 
contents of three safes, including gold and silver, removed one 
large safe which they could not open and took Maxine's personal 
papers, including credit cards and checkbook. (PX-82, 85; TRA. 
113-15; TRB. 20, 22-24, 636-37). Ethel also removed property from 
and asserted control over Mr. Grimm's office. (DX-211; PX-84; 
TRB. 28-29). 
When Maxine learned of Ethel's appointment and the break-
in, she wired Ethel and demanded that Ethel relinquish her 
appointment as special administratrix on the ground that Mr. Grimm 
had left wills and demanded the return of her property. (PX-88, 
81). Rex, after the break-in, traveled from the Philippines to 
Tooele and got copies in February of both wills. (TRB. 639). 
Even after Maxine's wire and after Rex returned with the wills and 
showed them to Ethel, the Roberts refused to withdraw Ethel's 
appointment as special administratrix and return the property they 
had taken from Maxine's home. (TRB. 639-41,11, 12; TRA. 118). 
The Roberts told Maxine that they would not relinquish Ethel's 
appointment or return her property until she signed a FSA (TRA. 
118) and they did not do so. (TRB. 936-37, 640-41, 11-12; DX-214; 
TRA. 118). 
-20-
While Mill.xine was in Utah , she r e t a i n e d I HIP s e r v i c e s of 
David Sal iGbury l.;o r e p r e s e n t I tin n ,1 I lit j\y!l all e , | I h I'll n, 
PX-174; TRB, 223) "I I ' l i i 'i"i Rex came t o U tah , he r e t a i n e d t h e s e r v -
i < • i"" • „ i I II: i n .in 1 1 I I I 1 1 I I I ) i » \ * ( II! 111!11 Illl Ill " in t R • 39 > \ I t houqh each r» i d e 
II ill r e t a i n e d counsel. , , t h e .lawyers d i d not i i e y o i i a t e trie oat; i r i .al 
r e f l e c t e d i n t h e Fiji i. ( I""RB, 236, 2 4 0 - 4 2 , 245 --lh, M/!, (.154-55, 
Til*-* b a s i c d e a l * h^ d i v i s i o n of Mr, Grimm's e s t a t e r e -
f l e c t e d i n t h e FSA was reached in :i s e r i e s of m e e t i n g s aiifl run 
v e r s a t io r ib be tween E t h e l , kej< V\\\ .i i in iiiil I i li in I In llliiii I 111111 111« 
in I I e r Maxino and Rex r e t u r n e d hi t h e P h i l i p p i n e s i in L i t e F e b r u a r y 
amid M,II I v IMI ill I 1KB. 236 , 240-4 J , M b - 4 b , 4 9 4 , b42 , bb4-L»l>/ 
9 1 5 , 9 2 4 ) . 
During March o! i'l'll in some 30 meetings accordinq hi 
U i * i, I 11 e I  11111 > in 1 i in 11 Il IP 1 in PI mi in in i in in in i II P P I P rl i s r u s s e d E t h e l ' s an cl f 111 a " s 
i li mi in in a r i d s t i n a g r e a t e r s h < m j u l Mi i j i n i u u s e s t a t e , ( T U B , ih II,. , 
I I  i>x - c l 1 1 ; DX 10 " li M I I M I " c o n d u c t c o n t i n u e d t o b e o u t r a g e o u s . 
She- i in in i i IIIIIII »c i panned mi IIIIIIIIII I I  I II I I III 111 i inp i \ ann n i ii|i m i; 
Marine's home unannounn " ^alk ii. -I.I. ' s'lail demanding a qceater 
interest in Mr. Grimm's estate. (TRA. 122-23, 125-27; TRB, 472; 
PX I aII in I ' I li in «, I 1 v ill III Il I I I I Il mi I 11III in H1 III I id 1 ,', 
e v e n v i o l e n c e h a s e i o s s e d my in i ml iV. I l l i i i i k id i t , lllliei d i s p l a y 
o f t e m p e r " w a s t h e m o s t v i o l e n t I t h i n k I ' v e ,se<a ' I I III I ' I ' III) 
Hip k o h o i t" r " t iinirlriinerd i I rli'in mil if i" I li il 1*1 he I aim!1 N i I i 
r e c e i v e 25% of Mr, Grimm's e s t a t e a f t e r a l l f a x e s , e x p e n s e s arid 
e n s ! id .iilmini "id ni t inn ( I'V U, DX-307; TRB. bD-bb, 6 5 3 - 5 5 , 479 ; 
TRA. 127-29)• The Roberts attempted to achieve this demand by 
repeatedly threatening (1) to claim Mr. Grimm's first divorce was 
illegal and Maxine's marriage invalid; (2) to go to the tax 
authorities, the BIR and IRS, and expose Mr. Grimm's tax problems; 
and (3) to side with the Parsons and work against Maxine so as to 
jeopardize the estate's 50% interest in Mr. Grimm's major 
businesses. (TRA. 122-23, 126-28; TRB. 466-67, 468-69, 470-71, 
472, 231, 237; PX-95). 
Ethel denied that she or Rex made any threats to Maxine 
and claimed that Maxine entered into the FSA "voluntarily and out 
of the goodness of her heart." (TRB. 55-56). A word needs to be 
said about Ethel's credibility. She admitted she lied — "And 
that was a lie, wasn't it? — Yes." (TRB. 71). She lied about 
paying a bribe to the Philippine taxing authorities. (TRB. 71). 
She testified categorically that no one ever said anything to 
Maxine on the subject of the legality of Mr. Grimm's divorce or 
the validity of his marriage to Maxine. (TRB. 43-44). But, Rex 
testified that was not true. He testified: MQ. Did you tell 
Mrs. Grimm in your wife's presence that her marriage to Mr. Grimm 
may be invalid? A. That's correct. Q. And did you at the same 
time tell Mrs. Grimm that Mr. Grimm's divorce — Mr. Grimm's 
divorce from Juanita Grimm may be invalid? A. Correct. (TRB. 
644). 
Mr. Roberts acknowledged the impact of that threat on 
Maxine. He testified that when he claimed Mr. Grimm's divorce was 
illegal and Maxine's marriage was invalid, "that got the job 
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best evidence of the impact on Maxine was not the testimony at 
trial but the letter she wrote to David Salisbury on March 29, 
1978, when she capitulated to the Roberts' demands. She wrote: 
I think it is most unfortunate that people have 
to make decisions under stress. When I get one 
minute to think I can see what has happened. I 
have been pressured and threatened so much that I 
am still in shock and probably will be til this 
is all over and I get to the point where I would 
say anything to end it all, and I think that is 
what Rex is working on—I should say both of 
them. (PX-95). 
Although both sides had lawyers, the lawyers only played 
a peripheral role in the settlement negotiation. (TRB. 236, 
240-42, 245-46, 915; DX-308; PX-174). The lawyers, of course, 
were in the United States (PX-174; DX-308), the parties in the 
Philippines. (PX-95, 190). Mr. Salisbury associated Philippine 
counsel, a Mr. Angara, to assist him in handling the estate, but 
Angara played no role in the negotiation of the FSA. (TRB. 527). 
The only thing the lawyers did prior to drafting the FSA 
was to enter into a stipulation in the probate proceeding below 
providing that Maxine and LaVar could be appointed supervised 
personal representatives and reserving other issues for future 
determination, (DX-260; TRB. 236). The only substantive conver-
sation between Mr. Salisbury's and Mr. Holbrook's offices occurred 
at a meeting on March 22, 1978. (PX-174; TRB. 231-32, 236, 
898-900). At the meeting Mr. Holbrook raised a number of ques-
tions concerning the legality of the divorce and the validity of 
the marriage, Mr. Grimm's competency to execute the trust and the 
Roberts' readiness to cause trouble with the taxing authorities. 
(TRB. 234-35). Mr. Salisbury testified that in substance he was 
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which she appeared and was represented h] f counsel, (I'X-I, c" I). 
No good faith argument could be made that her divorce from Mr, 
Grimm was subject to collateral attack. (DX-250, 252; TRB. 310, 
909). Mr. Grimm's wills and trust were valid and the defendants 
themselves admitted his competency. (PX-6, 7, 11; TRA. 480, 
482). Mr. Grimm was an American citizen and Ethel and Nita were 
not compulsory heirs. (TRB. 359-60, 344-45, 368; PX-160). The 
defendants simply did not have a claim for more. 
Certainly that was Mr. Salisbury's advice. (TRB. 242, 
243-44; 306). He was opposed to giving Ethel and Nita 25% of the 
net estate. (TRB. 242, 243-44). He tried to get his clients to 
permit him to negotiate a different deal but they refused. (TRB. 
242). Pete, when he met with him on April 17, 1978, told Mr. 
Salisbury that it was necessary to accept the 25% for Ethel and 
Nita to end the Roberts' pressure on Maxine. (TRB. 248-49, 
493-94, 314). 
After the basic deal had been struck in the Philippines, 
Rex and Pete traveled to Utah to draft the final settlement agree-
ment with the lawyers. (PX-174; TRB. 245-47). During the draft-
ing negotiations the parties negotiated issues such as having 
Juanita Kegley Grimm become a party to the FSA (TRB. 136) and the 
exclusion of certain bank accounts in Pete and Linda's names 
totaling $86,000 from the settlement. (PX-59; TRB. 507-08). The 
parties, however, did not attempt to renegotiate the basic deal — 
the deal under which Ethel and Nita would receive 25% of the net 
estate after taxes or the minimum guarantee to Maxine of $1.5 
million that Rex had agreed to because he thought the estate was 
so substantial that the guarantee would never come into play. 
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to the payment of taxes and expenses. (PX-58 at 8; TRB. 654-55, 
65-66). Instead of getting 3.7% of their father's estate under 
his estate plan, Ethel and Nita received 25%. (PX-58, 59; compare 
PX-169I with 169H). Under the FSA Ethel and Nita instead of re-
ceiving $192,846.00 from their father's estate, were to receive 
after the payment of taxes and expenses $1,277,038.00. (PX-169B, 
169C). Ethel and Nita under the FSA were to get not only six 
times the amount that their father intended to give them, they 
were to receive substantially more than Pete or Linda. (PX-169C). 
David Salisbury became the attorney for the estate under 
the FSA. (TRB. 249). 
E. Maxine's Ordeal Continued After the FSA. 
After the Grimm's signed the FSA, they worked under its 
terms until the fall of 1979. (TRA. 443, 446, 468-69, 208-09; 
TRB. 558-59). Estate taxes were paid (DX-272) and an Everett 
Steamship payment was distributed pursuant to the provisions of 
the FSA. (DX-229). Maxine, Pete and Linda operated under the FSA 
because they did not want the Roberts to start in on Maxine 
again. (TRB. 504-05, 558-59, 435, 424-25; TRA. 208-09). 
Maxine hoped the settlement with the Roberts would 
protect her emotional and physical health. (TRA. 176). She was 
wrong, her ordeal continued. (TRA. 176-77). It is unnecessary to 
recount all the disputes, incidents and accusations. (See, TRA. 
177-79). Some were serious. Mr. Grimm had a pig farm in the 
Philippines that was financially unsuccessful. (TRA. 177). Rex 
wanted the pig farm placed in bankruptcy in order to avoid paying 
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Salisbury. (TRA. 206-07). Mr. Salisbury called Maxine and told 
her to pay the bribe (TRA. 207; TRB. 268-69) and Maxine gave the 
money to Rex. (TRA. 208; TRB. 938, 996). Mr. Salisbury admitted 
he recommended that a bribe be paid. (TRB. 268-69). After Mr. 
Salisbury directed Maxine to pay the bribe, Maxine lost all 
confidence in him. (TRA. 208). She retained new counsel, Bert 
Rand of Washington, D.C., and told him that she wanted to 
repudiate the FSA. (TRA. 208-09). 
F. The Grimms Repudiated the FSA. 
There is absolutely no question that Maxine and her 
children repudiated the FSA years — four years — before it was 
even submitted to the court for approval. (TRA. 208-09, 441, 
468-69; TRB. 424-25, 505; DX-283; PX-173; see Br. supra. 7-9). 
Ethel testified that she knew Maxine was going to challenge the 
validity of the FSA in the latter part of 1979. (TRA. 468-69). 
Mr. Salisbury testified that he became aware Hin a formal sense" 
that Maxine, Pete and Linda were repudiating the FSA in Hearly 
1980.M (TRB. 274-75). Letters from Mrs. Grimm's new counsel 
reflect the repudiation. (PX-173; DX-283). 
The Roberts themselves acknowledged that no one had 
sought approval of the FSA prior to this action. (TRB. 656-57; 
TRA. 475). Mr. Salisbury testified "As long as there was a 
friendly relationship between all the parties, it is not unusual 
in estates to have an agreed-upon distribution that you simply 
file at the time you are ready to close the estate." (TRB. 151). 
But, there were no friendly relationships between these parties. 
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The relationships were so bad that both in the fall of 1978 and 
again in 1979, Mr. Salisbury prepared a written resignation and 
contemplated resigning (DX-281; PX-153; TRB. 252-53). Mr. 
Salisbury acknowledged he did not file the FSA for court approval 
even after he knew the parties were not getting along (TRB. 271) 
and he testified that he did not in any way prevent Rex, Ethel or 
Nita from seeking court approval. (TRB. 272). In any event, Mr. 
Holbrook had advised Rex to file the agreement with the probate 
court. (TRB. 994-95). Even after this action was commenced, the 
defendants and their counsel did not seek court approval of the 
FSA until they filed their counterclaim with leave of court on 
February 13, 1985. (CR. 362, 373-372; Br. supra. 7-9). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court's holding that the FSA could not be 
repudiated prior to court approval is flat wrong. The holding is 
contrary to settled authority, the plain language of the 
controlling statute, Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1101, and the basic 
policy of the Uniform Probate Code favoring the effectuation of a 
testator•s intent. 
The Grimms uncontrovertedly repudiated the FSA years 
before the lower court approved it and, indeed, years before the 
defendants even petitioned for court approval. The Rule is that a 
settlement requiring court approval may be repudiated at anytime 
prior to court approval. Mackey v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Co., 312 
S.E.2d 565 (S.C.App. 1984); Georaevich v. Strauss, 96 F.R.D. 192, 
197 (M.D.Pa. 1982), app. dismd., 722 F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1983); 
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Dacanav v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1978). The Rule is 
consistently followed in all types of cases requiring court 
approval of settlements from guardian ad litem litigation to class 
actions and is reflected in the Digest, 15A C.J.S. Compromise & 
Settlement. §§ 2, 8. 
The application of the Rule to court approval of an FSA is 
supported by the plain language of the controlling statute, 
§ 75-3-1101. Section 75-3-1101 explicitly provides, "A compromise 
. . . if approved in a formal proceeding in the court for that 
purpose, is binding on the parties thereto. . . .H The statute 
means what it says. Prior to court approval an FSA is not binding 
and may be repudiated. 
The Rule and the plain language of the statute are 
reinforced by the editorial board comment to §§ 75-3-1101 and 
1102. The comment provides, HIf all competent persons with 
beneficial interest or claims which might be affected by the 
proposal . . . concur, a settlement scheme differing from that 
otherwise governing the devolution may be substituted.H If the 
intended beneficiaries do not concur, there is no foundation for 
court approval of a settlement agreement materially altering the 
testator's estate plan and the intent of the testator should be 
effectuated. In the Matter of the Estate of Frank Chasel, 42 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3, at fn 3 (Sept. 15, 1986). Using this Court's recent 
decision in the Chasel case as the basis for a hypothetical, isn't 
it clear that prior to court approval of the compromise agreement, 
William Chasel would have been entitled to repudiate the FSA and 
present the newly discovered will of his father for probate? Given 
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the repudiation of Mr. Grimm's intended beneficiaries prior to 
court approval, there is no reason why the defendants and the court 
should be permitted to override Mr. Grimm's desires and write a new 
estate plan for the disposition of his property. 
Independent of the Grimm's repudiation, the court may not, 
under the Uniform Probate Code, approve a FSA materially altering 
or terminating a spendthrift trust. Absent the power of the court 
to approve a FSA under the Uniform Probate Code, the law is clear 
— the beneficiaries of a spendthrift trust, even by unanimous 
consent, may not terminate or materially alter the trust. 
Sundauist v. Sundauist, 639 P.2d 181 (Utah 1981); 4 Scott on 
Trusts, § 337.2 (3rd ed. 1967). 
The Rule does not change in the context of the Uniform 
Probate Code. The authorities have held that even where the courts 
have power to approve a FSA, the courts will reject a FSA 
terminating or modifying a spendthrift trust. Heritage Bank-North 
v. Hunterdon Medical Center, 395 A.2d 552 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1978); St. 
Louis Union Trust Co. v. Conant, 499 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1973); Breault 
v. Feigenholtz, 358 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1966), cert, den., 385 U.S. 
824 (1966). 
There is no question this FSA terminated Mr. Grimm's 
spendthrift trust. The FSA approved by the lower court 
specifically makes the assets of the trust subject to the FSA. The 
FSA requires that assets placed in trust for the support and 
maintenance of Maxine and subject to its spendthrift clause will be 
transferred to Ethel and Nita. There is simply no other source of 
funds to pay Ethel and Nita. But the FSA did not merely require 
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the transfer of the property placed in the spendthrift trust to 
Ethel and Nita, the FSA distributes Mr. Grimm's estate outside of 
the trust directly to his beneficiaries. The FSA displaces the 
trust, and distributes Mr. Grimm's property directly to all of the 
parties to the FSA, including Maxine, Pete and Linda. The court 
simply has no power to frustrate Mr. Grimm's lawful and clear 
purpose in providing for the protection of his widow and sanction 
the very thing he sought to avoid by a spendthrift clause — the 
dissipation of his property that he had set aside for his wife's 
care and support. 
The Uniform Probate Code requires a court may only approve 
an FSA "after notice to all interested persons . . . .M 
75-3-1102(c). The defendants failed to give the required notice. 
Charles Parsons and Byron S. Huie were appointed with Maxine as 
co-executors of the Philippine will. The Philippine will was 
admitted to probate in the court below. Mr. Huie and Mr. Parsons 
received notice of the petition to probate but received absolutely 
no notice that the defendants or anyone else was seeking court 
approval of an FSA as required by § 75-3-1102(c). 
The lower court found all interested persons had received 
notice. The finding was a fabrication. There was no evidence that 
Charles Parsons and Byron S. Huie had received any notice that the 
defendants were seeking court approval of the FSA. Indeed, the 
only evidence with regard to notice was Rex Roberts' admission that 
Mr. Parsons had not been given notice that the defendants were 
seeking court approval. (TRB. 992-93). The requisite notice is 
essential to the court's power to approve the FSA and the failure 
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to give that notice alone requires reversal of the lower court's 
j udgment. 
This Court has held the right to jury trial in civil cases 
is guaranteed by the Utah Constitution, Art. 1, § 10. 
International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & 
Implement, Inc. 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981). There were claims and 
issues in this action on which the plaintiffs were entitled to a 
jury trial. 
Maxine alleged in her complaint and proved at trial a 
claim for damages for the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. The lower court simply did not adjudicate that claim. 
The lower court did not grant a motion for a directed verdict (TRB. 
1121-1127) and the court did not enter any findings or conclusions 
with regard to that claim. (CR. 1254-1231). 
Utah recognizes the tort for the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and has adopted the Restatement Rule. Pentecost 
v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 700 (Utah 1985); Restatement (Second) of 
Torts. § 46 (1965). A plaintiff, as in any other tort claim for 
damages, is entitled to a jury trial on a claim for damages for the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, § 46, comment h (1965). 
Since the lower court did not adjudicate the plaintiffs' 
claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, Maxine 
is entitled to a reversal and a jury trial on that claim. If the 
court had granted a directed verdict on that claim, which it did 
not, a directed verdict, too, would be reversible error. 
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The Grimms were also entitled to a trial by jury on the 
issues of duress and failure of consideration. After trial, the 
lower court and not the jury decided the issues of duress and 
failure of consideration. It entered generalized findings on those 
issues. 
The plaintiffs in their complaint sought to set aside the 
FSA in part on grounds of duress and failure of consideration. The 
defendants, however, also sued the plaintiffs on a $10,000,000 
counterclaim for breach of contract and the Grimms in reply to the 
counterclaim for breach of the FSA again pled duress and failure of 
consideration, but as affirmative defenses under U.R.C.P. 8(c). 
The pleadings, thus, set up the issues of duress and failure of 
consideration both as claims and affirmative defenses. 
If the same issues are raised both in equitable claims and 
legal counterclaims, the preservation of the right to jury trial 
requires that the legal claims be tried to a jury first. 
International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & 
Implement, Inc., supra.: Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 
(1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). No 
one forced the defendants to plead a $10,000,000 counterclaim for 
breach of contract, but when they pled that counterclaim, the 
Grimms were entitled to a jury trial. 
The lower court found adequate consideration for the FSA 
from the defendants' forbearance of claims. (CR. 1235). The court 
further found there was a good faith controversy. The court, 
however, made no attempt to determine whether the defendants had a 
bona fide or reasonable claim to Mr. Grimm's estate. On the 
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contrary, the court concluded, "The defendants did not know that 
the claims thev asserted were unfounded. It is nbt necessary to 
find whether they were or were not unfounded." (Finding No, 65C, 
CR. 1236). Contrary to the legal standard adopted by the lower 
court, only a bona fide or reasonable claim can provide 
consideration for a FSA or form the foundation of a good faith 
controversy. Holt v. Holt, 282 S.E.2d 784 (N. Car. 1981); In the 
Matter of the Estate of James 0. McCabe. 420 N.E.2d 1024 (111. 
1981); Warner v. Warner, 1 A.2d 911 (Conn. 1938). 
The court not only adhered to an erroneous and improper 
conclusion of law in reaching its determination on the issues of 
consideration and good faith controversy, the defendants did not 
have and did not assert any bona fide or reasonable claim to Mr. 
Grimm's estate. The defendants had no bona fide claim that Mr. 
Grimm's divorce was invalid, that Mr. Grimm's wills or trust were 
invalid, or that they were compulsory heirs. The defendants, 
moreover, according to their testimony, never asserted any bona 
fide claim to Mr. Grimm's estate. Their lawyer, Mr. Holbrook, 
testified that he did not assert any claim on their behalf. Rex 
testified that while he threatened litigation, he did not know and 
did not tell Pete or Maxine what kind of litigation would be 
commenced, and Ethel, if she is to be believed, categorically 
denied making any claim prior to the settlement agreement. 
The court, thus, adhered not only to an improper rule of 
law, but there was in fact a failure of consideration for the FSA 
and no good faith controversy since the defendants did not have and 
did not assert any bona fide claim to Mr. Grimm's estate. 
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The lower court-s. findings specially and as a whole are an 
abdication of the court's fundamental responsibility to fairly 
adjudicate and determine the facts pursuant to Rule 52. The 
principal failure of the lower court's findings is its consistent 
refusal to decide subsidiary or subordinate facts relating to the 
Roberts' conduct/ their calculated campaign to obtain a FSA, and 
the impact of that campaign on Maxine. 
The lower court made no findings with regard to whether 
Ethel's petition to appoint herself as special administratrix was 
based on perjurious allegations, whether her purpose in making the 
petition was to gain control of her father's estate or whether she 
refused to relinquish that appointment after demand. 
The lower court made no findings with regard to whether 
the Roberts' break-in and burglary of Maxine's home was pursuant to 
their plan to force Maxine to agree to a FSA. 
The lower court made no findings with regard to the 
harassment, threats and intimidation of the Roberts during the 30 
plus meetings between the Roberts and the Grimms in the Philippines 
in March of 1978. The lower court made no findings with regard to 
the Roberts' threats, whether they threatened to claim Mr. Grimm's 
divorce was illegal, his marriage invalid, whether the Roberts 
threatened to cause trouble with the taxing authorities, or whether 
the Roberts threatened to interfere with the Grimms' relationship 
with the Parsons. The lower court made no findings with regard to 
Ethel and Rex's behavior or the impact of that behavior on Maxine. 
How can a court assess the impact of conduct on Maxine 
without determining what the conduct was? How can a court conclude 
-38-
that there was no duress or coercion if it simply ignores the 
perjurious abuse of process, break-in and constant threats and 
intimidation? How can the court decide the ultimate issue without 
any finding on the critical, subsidiary or subordinate issues of 
what the Roberts actually did to pressure Maxine into signing a FSA. 
The long and short of it is the Roberts' conduct and the 
court's findings are like two ships passing in the night, one 
unaware of the other. The fundamental inadequacy of the court's 
findings alone requires a reversal. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The FSA Under the Plain Language of U.C.A. § 75-3-1101 and 
Settled Authority Could Be Repudiated Prior to Court Approval. 
The lower court's holding that the FSA could not be 
repudiated prior to court approval is flat wrong. (See, Conclusion 
No. 8, CR-1232). The holding is contrary to settled authority and 
the plain language of the controlling statute. 
The plaintiffs uncontrovertedly repudiated the FSA not 
only before, but years before the lower court approved it. (Br. 
supra, at 6-8, 30-31). The court acknowledged that. (CR. 1236). 
The court concluded repudiation was of no consequence. (CR. 1232, 
1258-1256). The court, however, cited no authority for its 
conclusion that it could approve an FSA materially altering a 
testator's desired disposition of his property over the unequivocal 
opposition of the testator's intended beneficiaries, including the 
testator's widow. (Id.). 
The failure of the lower court to cite any authority in 
support of its position is no accident. There is none. The Rule 
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is that a settlement agreement requiring court approval may be 
repudiated at any time prior to court approval. Mackey v. 
Kerr-McGee Chemical Co., 312 S.E.2d 565 (S.C.App. 1984); Ferreira 
v. Arrow Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 447 N.E.2d 1258 (Mass.App. 1983), 
app. den., 451 N.E.2d 1166 (Mass. 1983); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. 
Altman, 463 A.2d 829 (Md. 1983); Pepitone v. State Farm Mutual Ins, 
Co., 346 So.2d 266, 268 (La.App. 1977); Vece v. De Biase, 197 
N.E.2d 79 (111. App. 1964), app. dismd., 202 N.E.2d 482 (111. 
1964); Georaevich v. Strauss, 96 F.R.D. 192, 197 (M.D.Pa. 1982), 
app. dismd., 722 F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1983); Dacanay v. Mendoza, 573 
F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1978). The Rule has been consistently 
followed in the courts and has been followed in all types of cases 
requiring court approval of settlement agreements. Id. The Rule 
has been followed in workmen's compensation settlements, Mackey v. 
Kerr-McGee, supra. (HThe Supreme Court indicated that the policies 
supporting the requirement of approval also support the result that 
settlement agreements are not binding until they have been 
approved** at 567); guardian ad litem settlements, Dacanay v. 
Mendoza, supra. (HWe hold that a guardian ad litem may repudiate a 
settlement agreement prior to court approval- at 1079); will 
contest settlements requiring probate court approval, Vece v. De 
Biase, supra.; and class action settlements subject to court 
approval under Rule 23(e), Georqevich v. Strauss, supra. (-However, 
where the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictate that the court 
must be a party to and approve of the settlement agreement before 
it may be consummated, any party may withdraw from the proposed 
settlement agreement prior to the court's final approval thereof" 
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at 197). The Rule is so settled that it is reflected in the 
Digest, 15A C.J.S. Compromise & Settlement, §§ 2, 8 ("Where a party-
repudiates the compromise agreement before it is approved or 
confirmed by the court . . . the court should not confirm the 
agreement" § 2 at 176). 
The rationale of the Rule is predicated on statutory 
language requiring court approval and the law of contracts, Dacanay 
v, Mendoza, supra. ("And like any other contract wherein a party 
lacks capacity, or when a required contractual formality has been 
ignored, the contract is voidable until the defect is remedied" at 
1080); and Georqevich v. Strauss, supra. ("In essence prior to the 
court's approval of the proposed settlement agreement, there is no 
more than an offer of compromise which is not binding and may be 
withdrawn" at 197). 
Certainly, the Rule is supported by the plain language of 
the controlling statute. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1101. § 75-3-1101 
provides in material part: "A compromise of any controversy as to 
. . ., the rights or interest in the estate of the decedent, . . ., 
if approved in a formal proceeding in the court for that purpose, 
is binding on all the parties thereto . . . ." The plain language 
of the statute reflects the Rule — a family settlement agreement 
is only binding after court approval in a formal proceeding for 
that purpose. The lower court's ruling is contrary to the plain 
language. That ruling necessarily holds that a settlement 
agreement is "binding" — it cannot be repudiated — prior to court 
approval. 
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This Court's decision in the recent case, In the Matter of 
the Estate of Frank Chasel, 42 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Sept. 15, 1986), 
supports the position that a FSA may be repudiated prior to court 
approval. In Chasel, there was an attempt to set aside a 
settlement agreement after court approval pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-3-1101. In holding that a FSA could not be set aside 
after court approval, the court said: HCompromise agreements 
authorized by Part II of the Probate Code must be approved in 
formal proceedings.M Id. at 4. The corollary of the court's 
language is that if a FSA is not approved, it is not binding. A 
hypothetical based on the facts of Chasel makes the point. If 
William Chasel had found the new will prior to court approval, 
would there be any question he had the right to withdraw from the 
FSA and rely on his father's will? 
The Grimms not only repudiated the FSA prior to court 
approval, they repudiated the FSA over four years prior to 
defendants even seeking court approval. (TRA. 468-69; TRB. 274-75; 
PX-173; DX-283; PR-236-252; CR-101-1; see Br. supra, at 6-8). The 
defendants' failure to seek court approval until 1985 is simply 
reflected in their pleadings. (Br. supra, at 6-8). In their 
original probate petition the defendants did not seek court 
approval of the FSA. (PR-84-81). In their answer and reply the 
defendants did not seek court approval of the FSA. (CR-203-195, 
212-204). The defendants did not seek court approval of the FSA 
until they obtained leave to file an amended answer and 
counterclaim on February 13, 1985, over four years after the Grimms 
had repudiated the FSA. (CR-362, 373-372). 
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There is simply no way, given the language of the statute 
and the Rule, that the Grimms should be held to have been bound to 
a FSA for seven years after its execution and four years after its 
repudiation. The testator's intent is entitled to more respect 
than that. The estate at issue is not the property of the 
parties. It was the property of Mr. Grimm. Mr. Grimm determined 
the disposition of his property and his heirs. His basic desire 
was to provide for the maintenance and support of his wife of 30 
years. The comments to §§ 75-3-1101 and 1102 make clear that the 
testator's intent is entitled to deference. This court 
acknowledged that in the Chasel case when it said: "The law favors 
effectuation of a testator's will." In the Matter of the Estate of 
Frank Chasel, supra, at fn. 3. The facts in Chasel again provide 
the basis for a hypothetical. If the new will had been found prior 
to court approval, wouldn't deference to the testator's intent 
require that William Chasel have a right of repudiation prior to 
court approval so that he could have the opportunity to probate his 
father's will? 
The plaintiffs having unequivocally repudiated the FSA 
prior to court approval and prior to the defendants' petition for 
court approval, the judgment of the lower court should be reversed 
with instructions to enter a judgment that the FSA has been 
repudiated and is of no further force and effect. 
B. Regardless of Repudiation, the Court Erred in Approving the FSA 
Materially Altering or Terminating a Spendthrift Trust. 
Edward Miller Grimm's trust by its terms was a spendthrift 
trust. The trust categorically precluded transfer or hypothecation 
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of any beneficiary's interest in the income or principal of the 
trust. (PX-11 at 9). The spendthrift clause supported the clear 
purpose and structure of the trust in providing for the support and 
maintenance of Maxine as the primary beneficiary of the trust. (See 
Br. supra. 15, 16-17). 
The court made no findings — none — relating to whether 
the trust was a spendthrift trust or Mr. Grimm's purpose in 
establishing the trust. (CR-1254-1231). In short, the court did 
not even address the issue of whether under the Uniform Probate Code 
a court could approve a FSA materially altering or terminating a 
spendthrift trust for the primary benefit of the trustor's widow. 
Absent court approval of a FSA under the Uniform Probate 
Code, the law is clear — the beneficiaries of a trust even by 
unanimous consent may not terminate or materially alter a trust if 
such termination or alteration would frustrate a material purpose of 
the trust. Sundauist v. Sundquist, 639 P.2d 181 (Utah 1981). This 
Rule, as this Court acknowledged, is supported "by a multitude of 
authorities.H Sundquist v. Sundquist, supra, at 187; see, 4 Scott 
on Trusts. § 337 (3d ed. 1967). One of the clearest applications of 
this Rule is where the Rule is applied to preclude the termination 
of a spendthrift trust. 4 Scott on Trusts, § 337.2. 
The Rule does not change in the context of the Uniform 
Probate Code. Decisions have held that even where courts have power 
to approve a family settlement agreement, the courts will reject a 
FSA terminating or modifying a spendthrift trust. Heritage 
Bank-North v. Hunterdon Medical Center, 395 A.2d 552 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 
1978); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Conant, 499 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 
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1973); Breault v. Feigenholtz, 358 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. 
den., 385 U.S. 824 (1966); Rose v. Southern Michigan Nat. Bank, 238 
N.W. 284 (Mich. 1931). Each of these cases squarely holds that a 
court with statutory power to approve a FSA will not approve a FSA 
terminating or materially modifying a spendthrift trust. Id. In 
Heritage Bank, for example, the court rejected a family compromise 
stating: 
Obviously, since the material purpose of a 
spendthrift trust is to prevent anticipation or 
control of future income or corpus by the protected 
income beneficiary, acceleration of the trust would 
directly contravene testator's intent. 
Heritage Bank-North v. Hunterdon Med. Center, supra, at 554. 
These same authorities further hold that even without an explicit 
spendthrift clause a trust for the primary support and maintenance 
of a beneficiary, such as a widow, is not terminable by a compromise 
agreement (Id. at 554) on the ground Hthe obligation of the courts 
to implement testamentary intent supersedes in these circumstances 
the general public policy favoring dispute settlement.H Id. at 555. 
Under this line of authority, regardless of the Grimm's 
repudiation, the court should have rejected the FSA because it 
terminated and materially modified Mr. Grimm's spendthrift trust. 
There is no question that the FSA terminated or materially modified 
Mr. Grimm's spendthrift trust. The FSA approved by the lower court 
specifically makes the assets of the trust subject to the FSA. 
(PX-59, 58). The FSA requires that assets placed in the trust for 
the support and maintenance of Maxine and subject to the spendthrift 
clause of the trust will be transferred to Ethel and Nita. (Compare 
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PX-169C with 169B; PX-58, 59; see Br. supra, at 27-28). There is 
simply no other source for the additional $1,000,000 plus that Ethel 
and Nita pick up under the FSA. (Compare PX-169C with 169B). But 
the FSA doesn't merely require the transfer of property placed in a 
spendthrift trust by Mr. Grimm to Ethel and Nita, the FSA 
distributes Mr. Grimm's estate outside of his trust directly to his 
beneficiaries. (PX-58, 59). The FSA displaces the trust and, 
contrary to Mr. Grimm's desires, his property is distributed not in 
trust, not with the protection of the spendthrift clause for his 
beneficiaries, but directly to the parties to the FSA, including 
Maxine, Pete and Linda. (PX-58 at 8, 9). 
Candor requires that appellants acknowledge that the* 
Restatement of Trusts adopts a modified rule. Section 75-3-1101 of 
Utah's Uniform Probate Code provides in part "an approved compromise 
is binding even though it may effect a trust or an inalienable 
interest." The Restatement's position is that a compromise 
agreement terminating or modifying a spendthrift trust will not be 
effective "unless approved by the court as in the best interest of 
the beneficiary." Restatement (Second) of Trusts, comment O 
(1959). The rationale of the Restatement is that a court should be 
able to approve a compromise under which a beneficiary surrenders a 
part of his interest under a spendthrift trust, since if a bona fide 
will contest were successful, the beneficiary's "interest might be 
destroyed altogether." Id. But, even if the lower court could have 
approved the FSA under the standard of the Restatement, it could 
only have done so if it found that the compromise was in Maxine's, 
Pete's and Linda's best interest. This FSA was hardly in their 
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interest. Ethel and Nita had no bona fide claim that jeopardized 
the Grimms* position under the trust. The Grimms did not benefit by 
the Roberts' blackmail and, in any event, the court made absolutely 
no findings that would support court approval under the "best 
interest of the beneficiary" standard of the Restatement. 
C. The Requisite Notice Was Not Given to the Co-Executors of Mr. 
Grimm's Philippine Will as Required by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-3-llQ2(g). 
The defendants failed to give notice to all interested 
persons as required by § 75-3-1102(c). Charles Parsons and Byron S. 
Huie were appointed with Maxine as co-executors of the Philippine 
will. (PX-7 at 5). The lower court found all interested persons 
had received notice as required by § 75-3-1102. (Finding No. 70C, 
CR. 1233). The finding was clearly untrue. There was no evidence 
that Charles Parsons and Byron S. Huie had received any notice that 
the defendants were seeking court approval of the FSA. Indeed, the 
only evidence with regard to notice to Mr. Huie and Mr. Parsons was 
Rex Roberts' admission that Mr. Parsons had not been given notice 
that the defendants were seeking court approval of the FSA. (TRB. 
992-93). 
The defendants' failure to give notice to the co-executors 
of Mr. Grimm's Philippine will was inexcusable. The probate record 
below discloses that both the Philippine and non-Philippine wills 
were admitted to formal probate. (PR-60-57). The record further 
discloses that notice of the petition to admit both of Mr. Grimm's 
wills to probate was mailed to Byron S. Huie, 471 Meadowlard Drive, 
Sarasota, Florida, and Charles Parsons, Box 886, Manila, 
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Philippines. (PR-24). Despite the fact Mr. Grimm's co-executors of 
his Philippine will had received notice of the petition to probate 
the Philippine will, they received no notice of the petition to 
approve the FSA fundamentally altering the distribution of Mr. 
Grimm's estate under that will. 
The failure of the defendants to give notice to Mr. Huie 
and Mr. Parsons is not only odd, it is fatal to the lower court's 
approval of the FSA. Under § 75-3-1102, the court can only approve 
a FSA after notice Hto all interested persons . . ., including the 
personal representatives of the estate. . .w Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-3-1102(c). The Uniform Probate Code, of course, defines 
personal representatives as including executors. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-1-202(30). The requisite notice is essential to the court's 
power to approve the FSA. The statute says so — "After notice . . 
./ the court, .if it finds . . . may make an order . . . ." (Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-3-1102(c)). The court cannot materially alter or 
modify the testator's estate plan without notice to his fiduciaries, 
including the co-executors. Could the court, for instance, modify a 
trust under a FSA without notice to the trustee? The lack of notice 
required by the statute alone requires the reversal of the lower 
court's judgment approving the FSA. 
D. The Plaintiffs Were Entitled to Jury Trial on Intentional 
Infliction of Severe Emotional Distress, Duress and Failure of 
Consideration. 
This Court has held the right to jury trial in civil cases 
is guaranteed by Utah Const, art I, § 10. International Harvester 
Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418 
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(Utah 1981). Although a jury was impaneled and heard the evidence, 
the plaintiffs were denied a jury trial when the court dismissed the 
jury at the close of the evidence and eight months later entered its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. (TRB. 1124-25; CR. 
1254-1231). 
There were claims and issues in this action on which the 
plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial. (Br. supra, at 8-10). 
The plaintiffs1 complaint in this action alleged a claim for damages 
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. (CR. 72, 
Eleventh Cause of Action). The issues of duress and failure of 
consideration were also set up both as claims in the plaintiffs* 
complaint and as affirmative defenses to the defendants1 
$10,000,000.00 counterclaim for breach of contract. (Second Cause 
of Action, CR. 86-85, Fifth Cause of Action, CR. 79-78, 
Counterclaim, PR-1633-1632, Amended Reply, CR. 942-941). 
The lower court literally did not adjudicate the 
plaintiffs' claim for the intentional infliction of severe emotional 
3 
distress. The lower court did not grant a motion for a directed 
verdict (TRB. 1121-1127) and the court did not enter any findings or 
conclusions with regard to that claim. (CR. 1254-1231). There is 
absolutely no ruling or adjudication in the record. The court did 
3The plaintiffs argued both before trial and at argument on 
motions at the close of the plaintiffs' case that they were entitled 
to trial by jury on their claim, and particularly Maxine's claim, 
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. (July 26, 30, 
1985 TR. at 7; TRB. 843). 
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decide the issues of duress and failure of consideration. The court 
entered generalized findings on those issues. (See CR. 1236-1232). 
1. Maxine had a right to jury trial on her claim for the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Utah recognizes the 
tort for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 700 (Utah 1985). Utah has 
adopted the Restatement rule. Id.: see Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, § 46 (1965). A plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial on a 
claim for damages for the intentional infliction of severe emotional 
distress. International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & 
Implement, Inc., supra.: Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46, 
comment h ("Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, 
subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in the" 
particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and 
outrageous to result in liability.H). 
Since the court did not adjudicate the plaintiffs1 claim 
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff 
is entitled to a reversal and a jury trial on that claim. If the 
court had granted a directed verdict on that claim, which it did 
not, a directed verdict too would be reversible error. Certainly 
Maxine more than proved a prima facie case: (1) her husband of 30 
years died on November 27, 1977 (TRA. 9); (2) from the time he 
entered the hospital on October 1, 1977, to his death, Maxine spent 
virtually all her time at the hospital sleeping on the floor nearly 
every night (TRA. 57-58); (3) she was emotionally and physically 
depleted from her efforts and her loss (TRA. 57-58); (4) while Mr. 
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Grimm was in the hospital, Ethel threatened Maxine that unless 
Maxine had her father execute a new will she would cause trouble, 
claim Mr. Grimm's divorce was invalid, her marriage illegal and 
commence court proceedings (TRA. 63-66; PX-70; DX-250, 252); (5) 
after her father's death, without telling Maxine, Ethel and Rex 
grabbed for control of her father's estate by securing Ethel's 
appointment as special administratrix through a perjurious petition 
in which she falsely swore Mr. Grimm had died intestate and she was 
the only heir resident in the Philippines (Br. supra, at 18-20); (6) 
in January of 1978, Rex and Ethel broke into Maxine's house and 
removed a safe, valuables and Maxine's personal property from her 
home (Br. supra, at 20; (7) even after Rex returned from Tooele with 
Mr. Grimm's wills in hand and Maxine had demanded the return of her 
possessions, the Roberts refused to return the property or 
relinquish Ethel's appointment until Maxine signed a FSA (Id.); (8) 
Ethel and Rex constantly pressured and harassed Maxine to agree to a 
FSA in a series of meetings and contacts in the Philippines in March 
of 1978 (Br. supra, at 21-23); (9) Ethel swore, screamed and the 
Roberts entered Maxine's home unannounced to repeat their threats 
and demands (Id.); (10) at the March meetings Rex and Ethel 
threatened to claim Mr. Grimm's divorce was invalid, his marriage to 
Maxine illegal, to cause trouble with the taxing authorities and to 
disrupt and interfere with the Grimm's relationship with the Parsons 
(Id.); (11) the impact of the Roberts' campaign on Maxine was 
devastating emotionally and physically (Br. supra, at 23-24; PX-95, 
96—partially admitted); (12) she wound up in the hospital in April 
(TRA. 189); (13) Maxine's ordeal did not end with the signing of the 
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FSA — the Roberts' continued their personal attacks (TRA. 176-79; 
PX-110); and (14) Maxine finally wound up in the hospital again and 
had to leave the Philippines in a wheelchair (TRA* 188-90)• 
A calculated campaign of illegal conduct/ including the 
perjurious abuse of legal process, the break-in of a person's home 
and the taking of personal possessions, coupled with persistent 
threats to claim a recent widow's marriage of 30 years was invalid, 
to cause trouble with taxing authorities and to disrupt significant 
business relationships, resulting in devastating emotional and 
physical impact is prima facie proof of extreme and outrageous 
conduct requiring a jury verdict on Maxine's claim of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. Pentecost v. Harward, supra,; 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46 (1965). 
2. The Grimms were entitled to jury trial on the issues of 
duress and failure of consideration. The plaintiffs in their 
complaint sought to set aside the FSA in part on grounds of duress 
and failure of consideration. The defendants, however, also sued 
the plaintiffs on a $10,000,000 counterclaim for breach of 
contract. (CR. 86-85, 79-78; PR. 1633-1632). Ethel's and Nita's 
counterclaim for breach of contract claimed that the Grimms had 
breached the terms of the FSA in a number of ways and claimed 
damages for $10,000,000 by reason of those alleged breaches. (PR. 
1633-1632). The Grimms in reply to that counterclaim again pled 
duress and failure of consideration, but as affirmative defenses 
under U.R.C.P. 8(c). 
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Duress and failure of consideration, as this court 
explicitly recognized in the Chasel case, are grounds to set aside' a 
FSA. In the Matter of the Estate of Frank Chasel, supra. But 
duress and failure of consideration are also affirmative defenses to 
a claim of breach of contract whether a FSA or any other contract. 
U.R.C.P. 8(c). The pleadings thus set up the issues of duress and 
failure of consideration both as claims and affirmative defenses. 
The claims to set aside the FSA on grounds of duress and 
failure of consideration were equitable. The $10,000,000 
counterclaim for breach of contract, however, was a legal claim and 
the Grimms were entitled to a jury trial on that legal counterclaim 
and their defenses to it just as any defendant in an action for 
breach of contract would be entitled to a jury trial on all claims 
and defenses. International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer 
Tractor & Implement, Inc., supra.: Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 
U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 
(1959). 
If the same issues are raised both in equitable claims and 
legal counterclaims, the preservation of the right to jury trial 
requires that the legal claims be tried to a jury first. 
International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & Implement, 
Inc., supra.; Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, supra.: Beacon Theatres, 
Inc. v. Westover, supra. Utah has adopted the federal rule on jury 
trial. International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & 
Implement, Inc., supra, at fn 2. The lower court simply violated 
the Grimms* right to jury trial by dismissing the jury and deciding 
the issues of duress and failure of consideration. Id. The lower 
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court ruled, as reflected in its findings and conclusions, ".. . . 
the principal issue in dispute was the validity of the family 
settlement agreement, a jury was duly impaneled to try any issues 
appropriate for jury determination after resolution of the validity 
isue.M (CR. 1254). The lower court got it backwards. The issues 
of duress and failure of consideration went to the validity of the 
FSA and were required to be tried first by jury trial. No one 
forced the defendants to plead a $10,000,000 counterclaim for breach 
of contract, but when they pled that counterclaim, the Grimms were 
entitled to jury trial on their affirmative defenses of duress and 
failure of consideration. Id. 
E. Contrary to the Court Below, the Forbearance of Unfounded Claims 
Cannot Constitute Adequate Consideration for an FSA or Form the 
Basis for a Good Faith Controversy and the Defendants Neither 
Asserted Nor Had Any Bona Fide or Reasonable Claim to Mr. 
Grimm's Estate. 
The lower court found adequate consideration for the FSA 
from the defendants* forbearance of claims. (Finding No. 69 and 
Conclusion No. 3, CR. 1235-1234, 1235). The lower court, however, 
made no attempt to determine whether the defendants had a bona fide 
or reasonable claim to Mr. Grimm's estate. (CR. 1254-1231). On the 
contrary, the court specifically concluded it was unnecessary to 
make that determination. The court's ruling can speak for itself. 
The court concluded: "The defendants did not know that the claims 
they asserted were unfounded. It is not necessary to find whether 
they were or were not unfounded.H (Finding No. 65C, CR. 1236) 
(emphasis supplied)). The court made no finding with regard to the 
issue of good faith controversy other than to ultimately conclude, 
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"The contest or controversy was and is in good faith." (Conclusion 
No. 70D, CR. 1233). 
1. Only a bona fide or reasonable claim can provide 
consideration for a FSA or form the foundation of a good faith 
controversy. The court reached its conclusions of adequate 
consideration and good faith controversy under an erroneous and 
improper legal standard. Contrary to the lower court, the courts 
hold only the forbearance of bona fide or reasonable claims can 
constitute consideration or form the foundation of a good faith 
controversy. Holt v. Holt, 282 S.E.2d 784 (N. Car. 1981); In the 
Matter of the Estate of James O. McCabe, 420 N.E.2d 1024 (111. 
1981); Kam Chin Chun Ming v. Kam Hee Ho. 371 P.2d 379, 403 (Haw. 
1962); Warner v. Warner, 1 A.2d 911 (Conn. 1938). 
(a) An F$A, as gny contract, require? consideration. 
In the Matter of the Estate of James O. McCabe, supra., (-Like any 
other contract, an agreement settling a dispute among family members 
of a decedent's estate, to be valid, requires sufficient 
consideration", at 1026). 
(b) The forbearance of unfounded or meritless claims 
does not constitute adequate consideration. Holt v. Holt, supra., 
(H[C]ases from other jurisdictions with near uniformity hold that 
absent any basis in fact and law upon which to challenge the 
validity of a will, a compromise promise to distribute the property 
differently from the manner contemplated by the will is 
unenforceable due to lack of consideration . . .", at 789); In the 
Matter of the Estate of James 0. McCabe, supra., (-The instant case, 
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were the agreement at issue acknowledged, would be a striking 
example of the consequences of overturning a testator's dispositive 
scheme merely upon the ill-conceived threat of a contest- at 1028). 
(c) A good faith subjective belief by the forbearing 
parties is not sufficient. Holt v. Holt, supra,, (-Whether there is 
a bona fide dispute depends, furthermore, not on what any particular 
party to the alleged compromise may subjectively believe about it, 
but whether the bona fides of the disagreement may, under all the 
facts and circumstances of the case, be reasonably found to exist by 
the trier of fact- at 789). 
(d) The claims relinquished must be bona fide or 
reasonable claims. Holt v. Holt, supra., (-The mere relinquishment 
of a right to contest a will is not sufficient consideration to 
support a reciprocal promise to modify the will unless there is a 
bona fide dispute as to the will's validity- at 787); In the Matter 
of the Estate of James O. McCabe, supra. (-'It goes without saying, 
however, that there must be some reasonable or substantial basis for 
the claims advanced by the parties which are surrendered by the 
agreement'- at 1026); and Warner v. Warner, supra., (-It is not 
necessary, however, that in order to constitute consideration it 
appear that there was in fact a good cause of action. It is 
sufficient if the forbearing party had any reasonable and bona fide 
ground for opposing the establishment of the will and forbears to 
exercise it because of the agreement- at 915). 
(e) In order for there to be a bona fide or 
reasonable claim, the claim must have sufficient merit to place the 
outcome of litigation based on the claim in doubt. Holt v. Holt, 
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supra.. ("This requirement that the outcome of litigation over the 
will be in doubt, most often expressed in terms of the need for a 
bona fide dispute, permeates our case law on family settlements" at 
788); Warner v. Warner, supra,, (H[I]n order to furnish a 
consideration for a compromise agreement, the contest must be 
instituted or intended in good faith and based upon reasonable 
grounds for inducing a belief that it is sustainable. 'With no 
basis in fact for a contest, and no reasonable ground for believing 
that a contest might rightfully be instituted and maintained, the 
agreement to refrain from doing so furnishes . . . no sufficient 
consideration for the promise'H at 914). 
The same requirement of a bona fide claim is essential to a 
determination of whether there is a good faith controversy. In the 
Matter of the Estate of James 0. McCabe, supra. In order for a 
court to approve a FSA under the Uniform Probate Code, there must be 
a good faith controversy. § 75-3-1102(c). It has been held that 
the essential requirements of good faith controversy and adequate 
consideration are the same. In the Matter of the Estate of James 0. 
McCabe. supra. The claims compromised or relinquished must be bona 
fide. Id. Without a bona fide claim there is no basis to believe 
that the compromised controversy was intended in good faith. Id. 
The court under the Uniform Probate Code, therefore, will only set 
aside a testator's disposition of his estate under a FSA if there is 
a compromise of a bona fide and substantial claim. Id., ("Although 
a family settlement agreement may under certain appropriate 
circumstances supersede a will, in no case will the court permit a 
testator's disposition to be set aside lightly. Otherwise, the 
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Probate Act would come to naught" at 1028). 
The lower court made no attempt to determine whether the 
defendants had asserted any bona fide or reasonable claim to Mr. 
Grimm's estate. The court did not do so because the court 
erroneously believed it was unnecessary — HIt is not necessary to 
find whether they were or were not unfounded.- (CR. 1236). In 
reaching this conclusion, the court adhered to an erroneous and 
improper conclusion of law and its judgment predicated on that 
conclusion must be reversed. 
2. The defendants did not have and did not assert any bona 
fide or reasonable claim to Mr'. Grimm's estate. Although the court 
acting under an improper legal standard failed to determine whether 
the defendants had and asserted any bona fide claim to Mr. Grimm's 
estate, the uncontroverted evidence demonstrates they had no such 
claim. 
(a) The defendants had no bona fide claim that Mr. 
Grimm's divorce was invalid. The uncontroverted evidence was that 
Mr. Grimm was divorced in a Nevada divorce proceeding in which his 
wife appeared, filed a cross claim for divorce and after trial was 
awarded a divorce decree. (PX-1, 2, 3; TRB. 1117). The decree of 
divorce granted to Juanita Grimm after her appearance and after 
trial was not subject to collateral attack 30 years later. 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 31 (1982). There was, as 
Maxine's lawyers informed her, no reasonable basis for any such 
claim. (DX-250, 252). 
(b) The defendants had no bona fide claim that Mr. 
Grimm's wills or trust were invalid. There was no question that Mr. 
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Grimm was competent when he executed his wills in 1959, and the 
uncontroverted evidence, including Ethel's own testimony, was that 
he was competent when he executed his trust in 1977. (TRA. 19, 44, 
480, 482; TRB. 442). 
There was no question the trust was validly created. Mr. 
Grimm executed his trust and simultaneously transferred by 
assignment all of his stock in Globe Investment Company. (PX-11, 
12, 13; TRA. 50-53; TRB. 441-442; Br. supra, at 15). Subsequently, 
he transferred additional property by written assignment and 
delivery of the assignments to his trustee. (PX-14-55; TRB. 444, 
448-50; see Br. supra, at 15 and 16). This Court has held an inter 
vivos trust is created when a settlor with intent to create a trust, 
transfers property to a trustee in trust for a named beneficiary. 
Sundguist v. Sundguist, supra. Although the Globe Investment stock 
was transferred on the books of the corporation and a new stock 
certificate issued to the trustee (PX-12, 13), a transfer or gift of 
corporate stock may be effected by written assignment without manual 
delivery of stock certificates or the transfer of the stock on the 
corporate records. Kintzinger v. Millin, 117 N.W.2d 68, 76 (Iowa 
1962); In Re Spain's Estate, 46 N.Y.S.2d 789, 791 (Sup.Ct. 1944); 
and Equitable Trust Co. v. Gallagher, 67 A.2d 50, 54-55 (Del.Chanc. 
1949). 
(c) The defendants had no bona fide claim that thev 
were compulsory heirs. Ethel and Nita were not compulsory heirs. 
Children are not compulsory heirs under Utah law and children of 
American citizens, such as Mr. Grimm, are not compulsory heirs under 
Philippine law. (PX-180; TRB. 359-60, 344-45, 368, 209; Br. supra. 
-59-
at 14). Mr. Grimm's domicile, whether in Utah or in the 
Philippines, was, therefore, of no consequence in terms of whether 
Ethel or Nita were entitled to any interest as compulsory heirs in 
his estate. (Id.). 
The plaintiffs proved Philippine law by the Philippine Code 
and the testimony of Emilio S. Binavince. Mr. Binavince's 
credentials were impressive. He was a Philippine lawyer, received 
Master of Law degrees from Tulane and Harvard, taught conflicts and 
comparative law at American and Canadian law schools, published 
articles on the law of succession in the Cornell Law Journal and was 
legal adviser to the Philippine Embassy in Canada. (TRB. 321-27). 
Mr. Binavince's unequivocal opinion was that the Philippine Law of 
Legitime was not applicable to American citizens and that even if 
Mr. Grimm died domiciled in the Philippines, his chidren were not 
compulsory heirs. (TRB. 359-60, 344-45, 368; Br. supra, at 14). 
Mr. Binavince's testimony was that the issue of compulsory heirs and 
the applicability of the Law of Legitime to foreign nationals under 
Philippine law was governed by Article 16 of the Philippine Code. 
(Id.). Article 16 squarely provides: 
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both 
with respect to the order of succession and to the 
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic 
validity of testatmentary provisions, shall be 
regulated by the national law of the person whose 
succession is under consideration, whatever may be 
the nature of the property and regardless of the 
country wherein said property may be found. 
(PX-180). 
Mr. Salisbury, who was called as a witness by the 
defendants, testified his office had tentatively concluded in some 
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internal research that in order to avoid the Philippine Law of 
Legitime "it will probably be necessary to claim that Mr. Grimm was 
domiciled in Utah at the date of his death." (DX-255). The problem 
with the Van Cott office's internal research is that it missed 
Article 16 of the Philippine Civil Code, the controlling statutory 
provision. (TRB. 215-16; DX-247). Mr. Salisbury candidly 
acknowledged that neither he nor his firm had any experience with 
Philippine law or access to Philippine law research materials. 
(TRB. 212). Mr. Salisbury, moreover, testified that neither he nor 
the Philippine lawyers who his office retained ever gave any opinion 
that Ethel and Nita were compulsory heirs under the Philippine Law 
of Legitime. (TRB. 306). Indeed, Mr. Salisbury unequivocally 
advised the Grimms that there was no legal reason to enter into the 
FSA. (TRB. 242-44). 
Erroneous internal research by an American law firm that 
overlooks the controlling Philippine statutory provision does not 
produce a bona fide claim. The defendants were not aware of the Van 
Cott research prior to this action. More importantly, the 
defendants made absolutely no attempt to controvert Mr. Binavince's 
testimony or produce any evidence that Ethel and Nita had any bona 
fide claim as compulsory heirs under the Law of Legitime. 
(d) The defendants did not assert any bona fide or 
reasonable claim to Mr. Grimm's estate. The defendants not only did 
not have any bona fide claim, they did not, according to their own 
testimony, assert any such claim. 
In order for the forbearance of a claim to constitute 
consideration it not only must be a reasonable or bona fide claim, 
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the claim must be asserted in the negotiations leading to the 
compromise supported by the consideration of the relinquished 
claim. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 71 (1981); Soar v. 
National Football League Plavers Ass'n, 438 F. Supp. 337, 334 (D. 
Rhode Island 1975), aff'd, 550 F.2d 1287 (1st Cir. 1977). The rule 
reflected in the Restatement is that "To constitute consideration, a 
performance or a return promise must be bargained for." Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, § 71 (1981). Accordingly, the forbearing 
party to a family settlement agreement must have asserted the claim 
in order for it to constitute consideration. Warner v. Warner, 
supra., ("'It was enough if he had an honest, reasonable ground of 
opposition and intended to use it1", at 915). A forbearing party 
cannot retroactively justify a FSA by adopting claims at trial that 
were never asserted prior to settlement. Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts (1981); Soar v. National Football League Players Ass'n, 
supra.; and Warner v. Warner, supra. 
The lower court found the defendants in good faith believed 
"that the claims they asserted regarding possible invalidity of the 
trust; possible invalidity of GRIMM'S divorce and effect of 
application of Philippine law were legitimate claims.w (Finding No. 
65B, CR. 1236). The court's finding that the defendants asserted 
claims, however, is contradicted by the defendants' own evidence. 
The defendants in this case clearly indicated that they 
would cause trouble and they would institute litigation, but they 
did not, according to their own testimony, assert any claim to Mr. 
Grimm's estate or even state what litigation or court proceedings 
they would pursue. Mr. Holbrook, the Roberts' lawyer, testified 
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that he did not at arjy time assert any claims on his client's 
behalf; (TRB. 898-901). Rex testified that he threatened 
litigation in March of 1978, but that he did not know and did not 
tell Pete or Maxine what kind of litigation would be commenced. 
(TRB. 651-54, 1010). Ethel, if she is to be believed, was 
unequivocal in testifying that she and no one else on her behalf 
made any claim to her father's estate in connection with the FSA. 
(TRB. 54-56). Ethel testified: 
Question: But, again, you had no idea what kind of 
claims you would make or anything like that? 
Answer: Absolutely not. 
Question: You never told Pete that you were going to 
make any claims? 
Answer: No. 
Question: Or Linda that you were going to make any 
claims? 
Answer: No. 
Question: Or Mrs. Grimm? 
Answer: No. 
Question: Nobody, to your knowledge, made any claims 
on your behalf, prior to the settlement agreement? 
Answer: No. 
Were you asked those questions and did you give 
those answers? 
At that time I did. 
Was it the truth? 
At that time it was. 
(TRB. 55). 
Ethel testified Maxine entered into the FSA simply out of the 
goodness of her heart. (TRB. 56). 
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There was a failure of consideration for the FSA since the 
defendants did not have and did not assert any bona fide claim to 
Mr. Grimm's estate. Correspondingly, there was no good faith 
controversy under the Uniform Probate Code, § 75-3-1102(c). 
F. The Lower Court's Findings are a Litany of Omissions, Half 
Truths and Unsubstantiated Conclusory Findings that Specially 
and as a Whole are an Abdication of the Court's Fundamental 
Responsibility to Fairly Adjudicate and Determine the Facts 
Pursuant to Rule 52. 
The Rule 52 responsibility of a trial court in actions 
properly tried without a jury is far more than an "anything goes" 
obligation. This court has recently stated: "We cannot over 
emphasize the importance of well written findings." Pennington v. 
Pennington, 16 Utah Advance Reports 5 (August 12, 1985). Conclusory 
findings will not suffice. Pennington v. Pennington, supra.; Rucker 
v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1979); Lvles v. United States, 759 
F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985) and O'Neal v. Gresham, 519 F.2d 803 (4th 
Cir. 1975). Subordinate or subsidiary findings are necessary "to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual 
issue" is reached. Rucker v. Dalton, supra, at 1338. Where the 
trial court provides only conclusory findings, a reviewing court 
simply is unable to determine whether the trial court's findings are 
clearly erroneous. Lyles v. United States, supra, at 944. 
The courts will critically review findings adopted 
virtually verbatim from those proposed by the prevailing party. 
Ramsey Const. Co., Inc. v. Apache Tribe of Mescalero Reservation, 
616 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1980). The lower court at the close of the 
evidence simply announced it was finding in favor of the 
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defendants. (TRB. 1125). Eight months later before all the 
evidence had been transcribed it entered its findings and 
conclusions adopting virtually verbatim the findings and conclusions 
proposed by defendants. This practice alone may not be reversible 
error, but the court got it backward. The court's decision should 
follow its factual determinations and not have its factual 
determinations attempt to justify its ultimate decision in favor of 
one party or the other. The virtual verbatim adoption of proposed 
findings eight months after trial without a transcript should 
genuinely elicit skepticism and critical review of the lower court's 
decisional process. Indeed, if the lower court was correct that the 
court and not the jury should decide issues such as duress and 
failure of consideration on the ground that they were equitable 
issues, this Court in reviewing a matter in equity can review and 
weigh the evidence and make findings of its own. Pennington v. 
Pennington, supra.: Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102 (Utah 1984). 
The principal failure of the lower court's findings is its 
omissions or failure to decide subsidiary or subordinate facts that 
were submitted for its adjudication. A court cannot discharge its 
responsibility, of finding the facts specially pursuant to Rule 52 by 
repeatedly avoiding the adjudication of controverted factual 
issues. Appellants will not repeat arguments addressed to the 
court's findings made elsewhere in this Brief (see sections C and E, 
Br. supra, at 47-48 and 54-64), nor will they attempt to raise every 
inadequacy in the findings below. The principal omissions, half 
truths and unsubstantiated conclusory determinations are glaring. 
1. The court made no findings with regard to the legality 
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of Mr. Grimm's divorce or the validity of his marriage to Maxine, 
although Rex acknowledged this was the principal threat used to 
obtain Maxine's consent to a FSA. (See Br, supra, at 22-23). 
2. The court made no findings with regard to Mr. Grimm's 
competency to establish his trust, although Ethel admitted her 
father was competent at the time he signed the trust instrument. 
(See Br. supra, at 16). 
3. The court made no findings with regard to the validity 
of the trust or its creation. The court did find that shares of 
Globe Investment were -purportedly- transferred to the trust at the 
time of its execution, citing PX-8. (Finding No. 14, CR. 1251). 
What kind of finding is -purportedly-? The uncontroverted 
documentary evidence, including the Bill of Sale, the stock ledger 
of Globe Investment and a new stock certificate, prove the 
simultaneous assignment and transfer of the Globe stock. (PX-11, 
12, 13). PX-8 is simply a typographical error that the court 
adopted from the defendants' proposed findings. PX-8 is a 1966 
codicil to Mr. Grimm's wills. 
In Finding 16, as proposed by the defendants, the court 
found Mr. Grimm executed additional assignments to the trust in 
August of 1977, citing PX-14 and 15. (CR. 1250). The citation 
again is another adopted typographical error. The exhibits 
demonstrating the additional notarized assignments are PX-14-55. 
The court found it was -questionable- if the additional assignments 
were in fact properly delivered to the trustee because Pete, the 
trustee, placed the assignments in his father's safety deposit box 
which was in their common name of E. M. Grimm. (Finding No. 17, CR. 
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1250). The placing of the assignments in the safety deposit box has 
nothing to do with the propriety of a delivery to effectuate a 
donation to the trust. That issue deals with whether the 
assignments were delivered by the trustor to the trustee and the 
uncontroverted evidence was that they were. (See Br. supra, at 16). 
4. The court made no findings with regard to whether 
Ethel threatened litigation or threatened to claim Maxine's marriage 
was invalid unless Maxine caused a new will to be prepared, while 
her father lay dying in the hospital. The uncontroverted testimony, 
including Ethel's own letter, supported those threats. (See Br. 
supra, at 17-18; PX-70; DX-250, 252). 
The court did enter a finding that the parties were "all 
supportive and helpful of one another during GRIMM'S last illness." 
(Findings No. 19, CR. 1249). How a stepdaughter's behavior that 
includes threatening to claim a marriage of 30 years was invalid and 
threatening court procedures was supportive or helpful is hard to 
understand. If her father had known what she was doing, he would 
have taken her across his knee and disinherited her. 
The court did find that Maxine asked to have another will 
prepared treating Ethel and Nita equally with Pete and Linda 
(Finding No. 24, CR. 1248), but the court failed to find the cause 
for the new will's preparation or the fact that the new will was 
prepared,so that if Mr. Grimm wanted to, he could change his estate 
plan and execute a new will. (See Br. supra, at 18). 
5. The court made no findings with regard to whether 
Ethel's petition to appoint herself as special administratrix of Mr. 
Grimm's estate was based on perjurious allegations that Mr. Grimm 
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had died intestate and that she was the only heir that was resident 
in the Philippines, whether her purpose in making the petition was 
to gain control of her father's estate and whether she refused to 
relinquish that appointment even after Rex had returned with Mr. 
Grimm's wills and a written demand for her to do so had been made. 
(See Br. supra, at 18-20). 
The court did find, as proposed by the defendants, that 
Ethel's appointment as special administratrix "was in accord with 
Mr. Salisbury's recommendation." (Finding No. 30, CR. 1247). The 
finding was a fabrication — it is totally false. Ethel filed her 
petition to be appointed as special administratrix on December 29, 
1977. (PX-79). On December 29, 1977, David Salisbury had not even 
met Maxine. He wasn't even retained until January 19, 1978. 
(PX-174; TRB. 223). 
The court in its findings does quote from a letter from 
Maxine to Ethel of December 2, 1977, stating with regard to Mr. 
Grimm's wills, "I am also sorry about all the mix up on the will 
bit" (Finding No. 27, CR. 1248-1247), but the record overwhelmingly 
supports the fact that Ethel knew Mr. Grimm died with wills before 
she filed her petition on December 29, 1977, alleging that he died 
intestate. (See Br. supra, at 19-20). The evidence includes a 
letter from Linda to Ethel on December 2, 1977, which the court 
fails to mention in its findings, stating in part that Pete had 
found a 1959 will (PX-73), and Ethel's own testimony that she knew 
Maxine believed that there were wills when she left the Philippines 
in December of 1977. (TRA. 508). 
6. The court made ho findings with regard to whether the 
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Roberts' break-in and burglary of Maxine's home was pursuant to a 
calculated campaign to force her to agree to a FSA. Instead, the 
court found that the Roberts entered Maxine's home to remove certain 
valuables Mfor safekeeping.H (Findings No. 31, CR. 1246). How the 
Roberts could be deemed to have taken Maxine's property "for 
safekeeping" when they did not call and ask her permission and one 
of the items removed was a large safe that 4 men had to cart away, 
is questionable. How the Roberts could be deemed to have taken 
Maxine's property "for safekeeping" when they refused, by their own 
admission, to return it after written demand is incredible. (PX-88; 
TRB. 1009; see Br. supra, at 20). 
7. The court made no findings with regard to the 
harassment, threats and intimidation of the Roberts during the 30 
plus meetings between the Roberts and the Grimms in the Philippines 
in March of 1978. (See Br. supra, at 21-24). The court made no 
findings with regard to the Roberts threats, whether they threatened 
to claim Mr. Grimm's divorce was illegal, his remarriage invalid, 
whether the Roberts threatened to cause trouble with the taxing 
authorities, or whether the Roberts threatened to interfere with the 
Grimm's relationship with the Parsons. The court made no findings 
with regard to Ethel's and Rex's behavior or the impact of that 
behavior on Maxine. (See Br. supra, at 21-24). 
The court did generally find that the execution of the FSA 
by the plaintiffs "was not the result of duress, coercion or fraud 
upon the part of one or more of the defendants." (Finding No. 67, 
CR. 1235). But, how can a court assess the impact of conduct on 
Maxine without determining what the conduct was? How can a court 
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conclude that there was no duress or coercion if it simply ignores 
the perjurious abuse of process, break-ins and constant threats and 
intimidation? How can the court decide the ultimate issue without 
any findings on the critical, subsidiary or subordinate issues on 
what the Roberts actually did to pressure Maxine into signing a FSA? 
The court did quote from a letter of Maxine on March 7, 
1978 (Finding No. 38, Cr. 1243-1242), but Rex testified that the 
discussions with Maxine about a FSA didn't begin until March (TRB. 
924), and the court in its findings totally fails to make any 
findings with regard to the Roberts' conduct during March and 
ignores Maxine's letter to Mr. Salisbury on March 29, 1978, after 
the Roberts' intimidation had obtained her consent to a FSA when she 
wrote: 
I have been pressured and threatened so much that I 
am still in shock and probably will be til this is 
all over and I get to the point where I would say 
anything to end it all. 
(PX-95). 
The lower court found that even if Maxine had been coerced 
into entering into the FSA, she was free to rescind the FSA after 
its execution had she desired to do so. (Findings No. 68, CR. 
1235). But, how could the court determine that Maxine was 
"physically and mentally able to attempt to rescind" if the court 
failed in any way to adjudicate the conduct of the Roberts that 
caused Maxine to sign the FSA in the first place? There is no 
question that after the Grimms signed the FSA they worked under its 
terms until the fall of 1979, but there was equally no question that 
the reason they did so was because they did not want the Roberts to 
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start in on Maxine again. (See Br. supra, at 28). 
8. The court made no findings with regard to the Roberts* 
abusive conduct after the FSA. The court made no findings with 
regard to the pig farm, the pearl farm or the Roberts insistence 
that a bribe be paid to the Philippine taxing authorities. (See Br. 
supra, at 28-30). The court did find that "both sides received 
benefits from the FSA" (Finding 69C, CR. 1234), but there were no 
benefits the Grimms received under the FSA that they weren't 
entitled to receive under Mr. Grimm's estate plan. 
9. The court's findings are replete with other 
inaccuracies and half truths. The court found that Maxine "having 
the benefit of Mr. Angara and Mr. Salisbury's opinion did execute 
the FSAM (CR. 1244, 1235), but the uncontroverted evidence was that 
Mr. Angara played no role in the negotiation of the FSA (TRB. 527) 
and Mr. Salisbury, as he testified, opposed it. (TRB. 242, 
243-44). Pete told him the Grimms had to agree to end the pressure 
on Maxine and refused to permit him to attempt to negotiate a better 
deal. (TRB. 242, 243-44, 248-49, 493-94, 314). 
The court attempted to portray the FSA as the product of 
negotiation in Salt Lake City at which lawyers representing both 
sides were present and participated (Finding No. 39 and 40; CR. 
1240-1241), but the uncontroverted testimony, including the 
testimony of Mr. Salisbury and Rex, was the basic deal — the 
division of Mr. Grimm's estate giving Ethel and Nita 25% of the net 
estate — was reached in a series of meetings in the Philippines 
without the participation of any lawyers. (TRB. 236, 240-42, 
245-46, 494, 642, 654-55, 915, 924; PX-92, 190). The uncontroverted 
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testimony is confirmed by the fact that every single draft of the 
FSA contained the basic terms of the FSA that had been reached in 
the Philippines before the parties came to Salt Lake. (DX-261, 
262A, 263, 264, 265, 266; see Br. supra, at 26-27). 
The court found that Pete told Mr. Salisbury in April of 
1978 that Maxine "wanted to go ahead with the FSA" (Finding No. 41, 
CR. 1240), but Mr. Salisbury testified that Pete told him his mother 
wanted to go ahead to end the pressure from the Roberts. (TRB. 
247-49). 
The court found that under the FSA "Maxine got her share 
free of tax- (Finding No. 69C, CR. 1234), but under the FSA Ethel 
and Nita were to get 25% of the net Estate after taxes and expenses 
and Maxine was obligated to pay Nita and Ethel whatever amount was 
necessary "so that each of them will receive an amount equal to 
twelve and one-half percent (12 1/2%) of the total of the net 
distributable estate and marital share." (PX-58 at 8). Certainly, 
Ethel understood that Maxine was to get her share after tax, not 
free of tax (TRB. 65-66), and the court, contradicting its own 
findings, found that the FSA "guaranteed Ethel and Nita a minimum." 
(Finding No. 40, CR. 1241). 
The court found, as the defendants proposed, that the 
petition for removal filed by the defendants in May of 1980, 
requested distribution of Mr. Grimm's estate "in accordance with the 
FSA.M (Finding No. 63, CR. 1236). The finding is a fabrication. 
The petition for removal does not in any way request distribution of 
the estate in accordance with the FSA. (PR. 84-81; see Br. supra, 
at 6-8). 
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The court found that Mr. Salisbury concluded that it was 
not unusual not to file family settlement agreements with the court 
(Finding No. 45, CR. 1239), but Mr. Salisbury's testimony was "as 
long as there was a friendly relationship between all the parties, 
it is not unusual in estates to have an agreed-upon distribution 
that you simply file at the time you are ready to close the 
estate." (TRB. 151). There was nothing friendly about the 
relationship between these parties. Mr. Salisbury, moreover, 
testified that he did nothing to prevent the defendants from seeking 
court approval (TRB. 272) and, in any event, the defendants lawyer, 
Mr. Holbrook, advised Rex to file the FSA with the Probate Court. 
(TRB. 994-96). 
The long and short of it is the Roberts' conduct and the 
court's findings are like two ships passing in the night, one 
unaware of the other. The plaintiffs submit before the defendants 
and the lower court be permitted to write a new estate plan for Mr. 
Grimm, the fundamental inadequacy of the court's findings requires a 
new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the lower court should be reversed with 
instructions to enter a judgment that the FSA is invalid and of no 
further force and effect on the ground that it was repudiated prior 
to court approval and on the ground that the court, pursuant to the 
Uniform Probate Code, cannot approve a FSA materially altering or 
terminating a spendthrift trust. Independently, the court's 
judgment approving the FSA would have to be reversed on the ground 
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that there was no notice given to the co-executors of Mr. Grimm's 
Philippine will as required by Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1102(c). 
Regardless of this Court's holding on the issues relative 
to the validity and enforceability of the FSA/ the judgment of the 
lower court must be reversed and Maxine granted a jury trial on her 
claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. If the 
FSA is not set aside on grounds of prior repudiation or material 
alteration of a spendthrift trust, the plaintiffs are entitled to 
have the judgment of the lower court reversed and remanded on 
grounds they were entitled to a jury trial on the issues of duress 
and failure of consideration. 
Even without a right to jury trial on those issues, the 
court's judgment approving the FSA must be reversed and remanded on 
the ground the lower court improperly concluded that the forbearance 
of claims could constitute adequate consideration for a FSA 
regardless of whether the claims relinquished were bona fide 
claims. The same error requires a reversal of the lower court's 
determination of good faith controversy, a necessary prerequisite tc 
court approval under the Uniform Probate Code. Assuming that the 
issue of failure of consideration was triable to the lower court, 
the uncontroverted evidence the defendants neither had nor asserted 
any bona fide claim to Mr. Grimm's estate requires the judgment of 
the lower court be reversed with instructions to set aside the FSA 
on the ground of failure of consideration and the same evidence 
requires the court's approval of the FSA be set aside for lack of a 
good faith controversy. 
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Finally, in the event the decision of this Court requires 
this Court to reach the questions presented with regard to the 
adequacy of the lower court's findings, the fundamental inadequacy 
of those findings requires the reversal of the judgment below and a 
new trial. 
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